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INTRODUCTION 
“You call what he doing okay? You call what he doing okay?”1 A bystander 
uttered these haunting words as he witnessed a Minneapolis police officer kneel 
on George Floyd’s neck for minutes until Floyd became unresponsive.2 Immedi-
ate protests erupted across the country, some violent.3 These protests address po-
lice brutality, police tactics, and systemic racism.4 One significant piece of that 
ongoing conversation has been qualified immunity.5 A Google Trends analysis 
shows that terms such as “qualified immunity” and “police brutality” have con-
comitantly risen with “George Floyd.”6 And the Google Trend peaks for both 
“qualified immunity” and “police brutality” are higher than they have ever 
been—a clear indicator that the public is engaged and concerned about this 
topic.7 
George Floyd’s death sparked renewed focus on qualified immunity8—a 
doctrine that had already been well-criticized prior to Floyd’s death.9 
 
1  Bystander, ‘Please, Please I Can’t Breathe’: Man Dies After Being Detained by Minneap-
olis Police, FBI Investigating, FOX 9 (May 27, 2020) (video courtesy of Darnella Frazier via 
Storyful), https://www.fox7austin.com/news/please-please-i-cant-breathe-man-dies-after-be-
ing-detained-by-minneapolis-police-fbi-investigating [https://perma.cc/FB4N-22Y9]. 
2  Id. 
3  Christine Hauser et al., ‘I Can’t Breathe’: 4 Minneapolis Officers Fired After Black Man 
Dies in Custody, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/26/us/min-
neapolis-police-man-died.html [https://perma.cc/BM34-N9WS]. As I am writing, protesters 
have set ablaze a police precinct not far from where George Floyd died. Dom Calicchio, Min-
neapolis Third Precinct Police Station Set on Fire After Rioters Break in, FOX NEWS (May 29, 
2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/minneapolis-third-precinct-police-station-set-on-fire-af-
ter-rioters-break-in [https://perma.cc/7ZN8-FQUT]. 
4  Jamila Michener, George Floyd’s Killing Was Just the Spark. Here’s What Really Made the 
Protests Explode., WASH. POST (June 11, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/2020/06/11/george-floyds-killing-was-just-spark-heres-what-really-made-protests-
explode [https://perma.cc/EJN9-BJ5P]. 
5  Debra Cassens Weiss, Death of George Floyd Brings Debate on Qualified Immunity for 
Police Misconduct, A.B.A. J. (June 2, 2020, 11:18 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/a 
rticle/death-of-george-floyd-brings-debate-on-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/4DR3-T 
83Y]. 
6  GOOGLE TRENDS, trends.google.com (search for “George Floyd,” “qualified immunity,” and 
“policy brutality” respectively) (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). 
7  Id. 
8  Weiss, supra note 5. George Floyd’s situation may be a poor vehicle for driving qualified 
immunity reform because prominent cases such as this often result in large settlements. Law-
rence Hurley & Andrea Januta, When Cops Kill, Redress Is Rare - Except in Famous Cases, 
REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-
police-immunity-outliers [https://perma.cc/Z6LQ-DUDD]. Courts could also find that the of-
ficers violated clearly established law as the Ninth Circuit did long ago in factually analogous 
circumstances. E.g., Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding officers violated a person’s constitutional rights when they placed their weight on his 
back and neck while the person repeatedly said he could not breathe and became permanently 
vegetative). 
9  Amir H. Ali & Emily Clark, Qualified Immunity: Explained, APPEAL (June 20, 2019), https: 
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Commentators have already pointed fingers at the Supreme Court—the institu-
tion that created the doctrine—as the responsible party, claiming the doctrine 
“facilitate[s] a law enforcement culture that tolerates extreme, even sadistic vio-
lence against civilians.”10 
Qualified immunity is no stranger to criticism. Academics have criticized 
the doctrine as both unlawful11 and ineffective.12 Media organizations have crit-
icized the doctrine.13 A major think-tank has created an entire website dedicated 
to abolishing qualified immunity.14 Public opinion data shows widespread sup-
port for abolishing qualified immunity.15 
And these criticisms are bipartisan. Congressional Democrats and Republi-
cans have signed on to a bill to abolish qualified immunity.16 Ideologically op-
posite media organizations have criticized the doctrine.17 Even traditionally 
 
//theappeal.org/qualified-immunity-explained [https://perma.cc/RCE5-FF6X]; Jay Schweik-
ert, Two Recent En Banc Decisions Exemplify the Injustice, Impracticality, and Persistent 
Confusion Inherent to Qualified Immunity, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Aug. 22, 2019, 2:35 
PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/two-recent-en-banc-decisions-exemplify-injustice-impracti-
cality-persistent-confusion-inherent [https://perma.cc/U2J9-WB7E]. 
10  Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Broke Police Accountability. Now It Has the 
Chance to Fix It, SLATE (May 27, 2020, 5:54 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-poli-
tics/2020/05/george-floyd-supreme-court-police-qualified-immunity.html [https://perma.cc/T 
339-46B9]; C.J. Ciaramella, The Supreme Court Has a Chance to End Qualified Immunity 
and Prevent Cases Like George Floyd’s, REASON (May 29, 2020, 5:30 PM), https://rea-
son.com/2020/05/29/the-supreme-court-has-a-chance-to-end-qualified-immunity-and-pre-
vent-cases-like-george-floyds [https://perma.cc/JFA5-MVUC]; Jay Schweikert, In the Wake 
of George Floyd’s Death, All Eyes Turn to SCOTUS, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (May 30, 
2020, 5:36 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/wake-george-floyds-death-all-eyes-turn-scotus 
[https://perma.cc/L5J4-UZEW] (“Mr. Floyd was ‘the latest victim of our near-zero-accounta-
bility policy for law enforcement.’ ” (quoting colleague Clark Neily)). . 
11  See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 46, 88 (2018) 
(arguing that instead of reinforcing qualified immunity, the Court should be “beating a re-
treat”). 
12  Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 9 (2017) (finding that 
qualified immunity as a policy tool rarely does the job for which it is intended: ending civil 
rights litigation against government officials). 
13  Schweikert, supra note 10 (noting how ideological opposites—Fox News and the New 
York Times—both agree on this topic). 
14  UNLAWFUL SHIELD, https://www.unlawfulshield.com [https://perma.cc/HPT9-777X]. 
15  Majority of Public Favors Giving Civilians the Power to Sue Police Officers for Miscon-
duct, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 9, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/07/09/ma-
jority-of-public-favors-giving-civilians-the-power-to-sue-police-officers-for-misconduct 
[https://perma.cc/T2VV-L3GW]; Emily Ekins, Poll: 63% of Americans Favor Eliminating 
Qualified Immunity for Police, CATO INST. (July 16, 2020), https://www.cato.org/publica-
tions/survey-reports/poll-63-americans-favor-eliminating-qualified-immunity-police 
[https://perma.cc/N8ZV-GSH6]. 
16  Eric Schnurer, Congress Is Going to Have to Repeal Qualified Immunity, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 17, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/congress-going-have-re-
peal-qualified-immunity/613123 [https://perma.cc/DBD6-KV4X]. 
17  Schweikert, supra note 10. 
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ideologically opposite Supreme Court justices—Justices Sotomayor and 
Thomas—have criticized the doctrine.18 
Yet even in a climate where abolishing qualified immunity has significant 
support, the Supreme Court has doubled down on its creation. In its last term, the 
Supreme Court had thirteen opportunities to address qualified immunity, some 
of which asked the Court to abolish qualified immunity entirely.19 But the Court 
declined to take up the qualified immunity question in any of the cases.20 And in 
recent years, the Court has only shown a willingness to strengthen the doctrine, 
not limit it.21 
Lost in the midst of the appropriately sensational civil rights cases is the 
costs of those civil rights cases. In all cases, qualified immunity is a defense for 
state actors in their private capacity. But because governments almost always 
indemnify their employees,22 the costs of civil rights litigation shift to the state, 
and, by implication, the taxpayers who fund the state. Since § 1983 was enacted, 
civil rights cases have increased dramatically.23 
These costs are not insignificant.24 As civil rights cases increase, government 
attorneys must spend more time addressing those cases and less time on other 
valuable projects. Or governments must hire more staff to handle the increased 
caseload, which requires less expenditures in another area or an increase in fund-
ing. Often, governments may choose to contract these cases out to other 
 
18  Weiss, supra note 5. 
19  Jay Schweikert, Supreme Court Will Soon Decide Whether to Reconsider Qualified Immun-
ity, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (Apr. 28, 2020, 4:26 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/may-
15th-supreme-court-will-finally-decide-whether-hear-cases-calling-abolition-qualified [https: 
//perma.cc/2M3P-HVPY]. 
20  Jordan S. Rubin, Justices Turn down Trio of Qualified Immunity Doctrine Cases (2), 
BLOOMBERG L. (May 18, 2020, 2:29 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/jus-
tices-wont-hear-trio-of-cases-on-qualified-immunity-doctrine [https://perma.cc/NP8M-4TQ 
M]; John Kruzel, Supreme Court Sidesteps New Cases on Gun Rights, Police Protections, THE 
HILL (June 15, 2020, 9:45 AM), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/502721-supreme-
court-sidesteps-new-cases-on-gun-rights-police-protections [https://perma.cc/6V5H-UX2F] 
 (noting the court denied eight separate qualified immunity cases). 
21  See Brent Kendall & Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Turns down Cases Challenging Immunity 
Protections for Police, WALL ST. J. (June 15, 2020, 5:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/supreme-court-turns-down-cases-challenging-immunity-protections-for-police-1159225 
7204 [https://perma.cc/E2PB-FFNZ]. 
22  Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014) (noting 
that officers between 2006 and 2011 only paid .02 percent of $730 million in civil suits because 
the municipality usually indemnifies them). 
23  Over Two Decades, Civil Rights Cases Rise 27 Percent, U.S. COURTS (June 9, 2014), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/06/09/over-two-decades-civil-rights-cases-rise-27-per-
cent [https://perma.cc/UVZ6-3V2Q] (noting that the number of cases is fifty times the number 
filed since 1964 and an increase of 27 percent in the last two decades). 
24  As Justice Scalia puts it, “as civil-rights claims increase, the cost of civil-rights insurance 
increases.” Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 419 n.3 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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attorneys,25 freeing up their own staff yet incurring significant additional costs. 
Regardless, taxpayers must, in some way, bear these costs. 
Of course, compensating worthy litigants is desirable. After all, injured par-
ties deserve some redress. However, many civil rights litigants are not ultimately 
successful,26 which adds costs to a government that need not have been borne. 
This is perhaps why, at least in the prisoner civil rights context, Congress has 
already enacted some statutory reform to reduce frivolous litigation,27 for exam-
ple, which concomitantly reduces government costs. 
Qualified immunity seeks to balance the benefit of compensating worthy lit-
igants against the danger of imposing resource costs on government officials 
when doing so could be deleterious to the public.28 In light of recent scholarship 
criticizing the doctrine’s effectiveness in reaching its desired goals, however, it 
is worth reexamining the doctrine and asking if there might be a better way to 
balance these interests. 
The goal of this Note is to provide that solution. Part I will provide a histor-
ical overview of qualified immunity. Part II will address some of qualified im-
munity’s most pernicious problems and present a congressional reform package 
designed to cure those maladies. While this Note primarily addresses qualified 
immunity and § 1983 in the context of executive branch officials because it af-
fects them most,29 it is important to remember that qualified immunity affects all 
government officials in various types of cases.30 
 
25  See Kent J. Bullard, Filarsky v. Delia: An Unqualified Win for Qualified Immunity, W. CITY 
(Dec. 1, 2012), https://www.westerncity.com/article/filarsky-v-delia-unqualified-win-quali-
fied-immunity [https://perma.cc/3SAM-8SA4]. 
26  See Theodore Eisenberg, Four Decades of Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 12 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 4, 11–12 (2015) (demonstrating that for constitutional torts, defendants prevail 
far more often at trial than plaintiffs, and the number of terminations in federal district court 
over time has increased). Cf. MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CITIZEN 
COMPLAINTS ABOUT POLICE USE OF FORCE 3 (2006) (noting that out of all complaints with a 
disposition, only 8 percent of the complaints were sustained). 
27  Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559–60 (2003). 
28  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–16 (1982). 
29  Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 235 (2006). 
30  The thirteen cases the Court could have chosen to hear, but did not, provide a good sampling 
of the different types of cases qualified immunity touches. For example, Ermold v. Davis, 855 
F.3d 715 (6th Cir. 2017) dealt with Kim Davis, the county clerk who refused to issue a mar-
riage license to a homosexual couple. Id. at 716–17. And Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 
462 (5th Cir. 2019) dealt with a case where state investigators barged into an office and re-
viewed medical files without notice or warrant. Id. at 470. These cases serve as helpful re-
minders that not all § 1983 cases deal with police officers and excessive force; therefore, any 
changes to qualified immunity should avoid narrowly looking at problems in the police context 
and recognize the larger implications. As Shakespeare’s Friar Lawrence said, “Wisely and 
slow. They stumble that run fast.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 3, l. 
1129. 
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I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Qualified immunity did not originate with Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 32 
(1974)31 nor Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), as many scholars believe, 
though those Supreme Court cases are important reference points.32 Instead, 
qualified immunity really begins with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself. After all, no gov-
ernment official would need an affirmative defense without a statute permitting 
liability in the first place. Consequently, understanding § 1983’s text, purpose, 
legislative history, and social context will be helpful in examining just how far 
qualified immunity should extend. 
A. The Beginning: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Congress crafted § 1983 within a specific cultural context: post-Civil War 
and mid-Reconstruction.33 Even though passing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments helped create a national vision of a more racially equal America,34 
it came as no surprise that those amendments did not self-execute.35 Though con-
stitutionally prohibited from denying individuals the “equal protection of the 
laws,”36 states continued to enact laws intent on accomplishing that very pur-
pose.37 These Jim Crow laws and Black Codes limited individual liberty and 
freedoms.38 Beyond these institutionalized laws, the Ku Klux Klan used violence 
and local government actors to enforce a vision contrary to the Second Found-
ing.39 Because of this violence, President Ulysses S. Grant sent Congress a mes-
sage imploring Congress to use its legislative power to provide additional pro-
tection for liberty and property.40 
Thereafter, Congress introduced legislation to “enforce the provisions of the 
fourteenth amendment [sic] to the Constitution of the United States” that, though 
hotly debated, passed as the Civil Rights Act of 1871.41 Now codified as 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, the act provides, in pertinent part, that any person deprived “of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by 
 
31  John C. Williams, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1299 (2012). 
32  Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 
GA. L. REV. 597, 601–02 (1989). 
33  Susanah M. Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a 
Distorted Picture, 65 N.C. L. REV. 517, 517–18 (1987). 
34  Id. at 518. 
35  But see Steven A. Engel, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of 
Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 124–25 
(1999) (arguing that the original intention of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment meant 
the amendment to be self-executing). 
36  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
37  Mead, supra note 33, at 518. 
38  PHILLIP S. PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 51, 215 (1975). 
39  Mead, supra note 33, at 518 n.6. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 244, at XXIII (1871)). 
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any person acting “under [the] color of [state law]” can bring a private civil suit 
for monetary damages.42 Even though § 1983’s language appears clear on its 
face, courts have consistently struggled to apply it over time, constantly disa-
greeing over how to interpret the statute, the breadth of its scope, and to whom 
it applies.43 These disagreements, contradictory rulings, and interpretations 
muddy the water for courts seeking to interpret the statute today.44 
 That being said, at least one broad, central theme from § 1983 emerges from 
judicial rulings: its idealistic purpose. As one court has stated, the “purpose of 
Section 1983, according to its legislative history, is to redress violations of ‘hu-
man liberty and human rights’ committed by the States, state officials, or under 
color of state law.”45 The Supreme Court has authoritatively declared: 
Th[e] legislative history [of § 1983] makes evident that Congress clearly con-
ceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with 
respect to the protection of federally created rights; it was concerned that state 
instrumentalities could not protect those rights; it realized that state officers might, 
in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights; and it believed that these 
failings extended to the state courts. . . . The very purpose of § 1983 was to inter-
pose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the 
people’s federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under 
color of state law.46 
Yet another justice has declared that § 1983 really effects a trifold purpose: 
override some state laws, provide federal remedies when the state provides none, 
and provide a federal remedy where the state remedy is practically inadequate.47 
Regardless of the expression, § 1983’s overarching purpose is transparent; 
Congress intended to prevent individual state actors from using their authority to 
subvert constitutional rights in the racial context. And when state actors do vio-
late constitutional rights, victims should be compensated and the actor punished. 
That basic goal has remained clear. Yet the Supreme Court has struggled to in-
terpret § 1983’s breadth, which means that at times its pronouncements have 
strengthened § 1983’s power, such as the rulings that helped foster the Civil 
Rights movement; but at other times, the Court has seemingly restricted its power 
and reach.48 
While the Supreme Court has exercised significant power in determining 
§ 1983’s reach, Congress—§ 1983’s creator—has remained in the background 
of this conversation, unwilling to touch or clarify the doctrine. Congress has the 
power to amend § 1983 to its liking based on the policy concerns prevalent today 
 
42  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
43  Mead, supra note 33, at 519–20. 
44  Id. 
45  Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 226 (N.D.N.Y. 1979). 
46  Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
47  Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the “Background” of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 
7 (1974) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1961)). 
48  Mead, supra note 33, at 519–20 (discussing the various cases that have restricted § 1983’s 
influence and cases, such as Monroe v. Pape, that have made § 1983 more available). 
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but has chosen not to. If others see § 1983 today as failing its purpose, then, just 
as President Grant called to action that Congress because of the then-perceived 
societal ills, those who see § 1983’s failings should call upon Congress to amend 
§ 1983 in a way that clarifies its scope and purpose for today. But when Congress 
enacted § 1983, it chose a policy of favoring potential litigants. It has since stood 
by that stance through inaction, witnessing the doctrine’s impact upon the 
courts.49 With this clear purpose in mind, it begs the question: Why would the 
Supreme Court articulate a doctrine that seemingly undercuts a clear congres-
sional purpose? 
B. Creating a Defense: The Many Faces of Qualified Immunity over the Years 
While the Supreme Court did back away from a very restrictive reading of 
§ 1983 and embrace an expansive reading,50 the Court has since then found ways 
to mitigate those effects through creating (or adopting) a § 1983 defense and 
constantly improving it.51 This defense—qualified immunity—has grown so 
powerful that many call it an “obstacle” to civil rights claims52 and potentially 
unconstitutional.53 The Supreme Court itself has recently declared that qualified 
immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent.’ ”54 
Importantly, when Congress adopted § 1983, it included no explicit provi-
sion creating such a defense,55 nor does the legislative history infer a defense 
would exist.56 In fact, a plain reading of the statute’s broad, sweeping language 
could be seen as evidence that such a defense should not exist at all.57 Yet it does, 
much to the chagrin of civil rights scholars.58 
Because of its controversial nature and the enormous amounts of civil rights 
litigation today, qualified immunity is constantly litigated, or, at the least, in the 
 
49  See Eric H. Zagrans, “Under Color of” What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 
Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 595 (1985) (noting that Monroe v. Pape unleashed the “flood-
gates of litigation”). 
50  Mead, supra note 33, at 520. 
51  Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Un-
constitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, 126 (1985) (noting that 
the Supreme Court adopted a new objective standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald). 
52  Rob Yale, Note, Searching for the Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1841, 1850 (1997). 
53  George Leef, Qualified Immunity -- A Rootless Doctrine the Court Should Jettison, FORBES 
(Mar. 21, 2018, 9:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2018/03/21/qualified-im-
munity-a-rootless-doctrine-the-court-should-jettison [https://perma.cc/J2FE-E5XU]. 
54  White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 
(2015)). 
55  David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activ-
ism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 36 (1989). 
56  Id. at 30. 
57  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
58  See Baude, supra note 11. 
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background of the litigation.59 “Just like its muddied approach to interpreting 
§ 1983, the Supreme Court has adopted various standards and interpretive meth-
ods over time that have yielded conflicting views about the nature and scope of 
the doctrine of qualified immunity.”60 It is likely that these competing visions 
depend upon the specific cultural context in which they are spawned but also 
reflect each justice’s views about the proper scope of § 1983 itself and the degree 
to which individual state actors should be liable within the course of their duties. 
Recently, the Court has embraced qualified immunity as a potent defense 
that aggressively sifts out potential litigants.61 Indeed, one author views these 
changes to the doctrine as a process whereby the Supreme Court seeks to (a) 
transform qualified immunity into an absolute immunity and (b) shift the fact-
finding power from the jury to the judge.62 However, the Court has not always 
embraced such an expansive vision. Over time, the Court has adopted various 
standards that embrace different notions of qualified immunity’s purpose, and 
without fail, each of these standards has generated considerable controversy. And 
each standard has been announced and practiced without any explicit congres-
sional endorsement. 
Evaluating each of the Court’s various standards helps explain the Court’s 
consistent policy justifications, and it helps reaffirm that this policy is malleable 
and can and should be tweaked to better serve its real policy goals. The foregoing 
Section hopes to illustrate just a few of the monumental cases that have shaped 
the Court’s jurisprudence on qualified immunity. 
1. Pierson v. Ray 
In Pierson v. Ray, white and black clergymen attempted to promote racial 
integration through a “prayer pilgrimage” by trying to use a segregated bus ter-
minal waiting room.63 Mississippi code at the time made it a misdemeanor to 
congregate with others in public so as to breach the peace and then refuse to 
move when so ordered by police.64 Municipal police officers arrested the clergy-
men under this ordinance, and a municipal police justice convicted them.65 The 
clergymen then brought a suit against the officers and police justice in federal 
court for violating federal rights pursuant to § 1983.66 
 
59  Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003 (2002) (finding an “explosion” of civil rights legislation is due to 
Monroe v. Pape). 
60  Schweikert, supra note 9. 
61  See White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (noting that qualified immunity protects “all 
but the plainly incompetent” (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015))). 
62  Chen, supra note 29, at 231–33. 
63  Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 549, 552 (1967). 
64  Id.at 549. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. at 550. 
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In the district court, the clergymen lost. But on appeal, the court of appeals 
held the police officers liable under § 1983 because the Mississippi law the of-
ficers used to arrest the clergyman had been declared unconstitutional.67 For the 
parallel state claim, however, the court of appeals found that the common law 
shielded officers from liability so long as they had “probable cause to believe the 
statute has been violated because Mississippi law does not require police officers 
to predict at their peril which state laws are constitutional and which are not.”68 
The Supreme Court eventually took the case to resolve whether the police 
officers could assert a “good faith and probable cause” defense to an action aris-
ing under § 1983.69 Relying on traditional defenses to tort law, the Supreme 
Court ruled that since police officers are generally not liable under tort law for 
false arrest when they arrest someone who is later proven innocent, they should 
not be liable for enforcing an unconstitutional statute—facially or as applied—if 
they “reasonably believed” the statute was valid.70 The Court reaffirmed earlier 
precedent, stating that § 1983 “ ‘should be read against the background of tort 
liability’ . . . . Part of [that] background . . . is the defense of good faith and prob-
able cause.”71 
Pierson’s legacy, in effect, imports state common-law defenses and com-
mon-law notions of sovereign immunity into § 1983 litigation and interpreta-
tion.72 As the Court noted, the official standard for this “limited” immunity for 
police officers was “good faith and probable cause.”73 However, in dicta, the 
Court used a few phrases that would hang around for decades to come and fore-
shadow the eventual shift in the qualified immunity standard. Indeed, in a hypo-
thetical, the Court remarked that not only must the standard be a “good faith” 
standard, but the officers must “reasonably believe[]” the statute was constitu-
tional.74 Furthermore, the Court made one sentiment that, to some degree, sums 
up the common sentiment used to justify qualified immunity today: “We agree 
that a police officer is not charged with predicting the future course of constitu-
tional law.”75 In other words, police officers are entitled to judgment deference 
when the law is not particularly clear. 
In his dissent, Justice William O. Douglas criticized the nature of this im-
munity as well as its rationale. While he mainly criticized the Court’s holding in 
granting unqualified immunity to the police justice, Justice Douglas’s rationale 
stands as poignant criticism of the doctrine generally.76 First, he argued that the 
 
67  Id. 
68  Id. at 551. 
69  Id. at 551–52. 
70  Id. at 555. 
71  Id. at 556–57 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1967)). 
72  See id. at 557. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  See id. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
21 NEV. L.J. 835 
Spring 2021] GIVING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TEETH 845 
very idea of these “exception[s]”—whether legislative, judicial, or executive—
undermines the core of § 1983.77 Second, he argued that the question of immun-
ity is nothing more than a statutory interpretation issue, and Congress made clear 
that “every person” under § 1983 meant every person acting under color of state 
law.78 
Third, while the majority focused on statutory interpretation with a back-
ground in tort law,79 Justice Douglas argued that the interpretative background 
should instead be the historical civil rights violations which prompted § 1983 in 
the first place.80 Indeed, § 1983 is a remedial measure; relying on common law 
to interpret this statute in a way that weakens its remedial power just does not 
make sense.81 Finally, and perhaps most imperatively, Justice Douglas attacked 
one of qualified immunity supporters’ major policy positions: “The argument 
that the actions of public officials must not be subjected to judicial scrutiny be-
cause to do so would have an inhibiting effect on their work, is but a more so-
phisticated manner of saying ‘The King can do no wrong.’ ”82 Justice Douglas 
thought the likelihood that these notions of suit would actually interfere with 
another’s work was at best minimal.83 
2. Harlow v. Fitzgerald 
The more modern conception of the qualified immunity standard, however, 
begins with Harlow v. Fitzgerald.84 In Harlow, the petitioner contended that two 
of President Richard Nixon’s senior aides engaged in a conspiracy to violate his 
constitutional and statutory rights and that they completed this conspiracy when 
they ultimately fired him from his position.85 In pre-trial litigation, the aides 
made several immunity arguments: (1) they were entitled to absolute immunity 
as an “incident of their offices as Presidential aides,”86 (2) “derivative” immun-
ity,87 (3) a “special functions” immunity,88 and (4) qualified immunity.89 While 
the Court summarily dismissed most of the immunity arguments,90 the Court 
 
77  Id. 
78  Id. at 559, 565. 
79  Id. at 556–57 (majority opinion). 
80  Id. at 560 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
81  Id. at 561. 
82  Id. at 565. 
83  Id. 565–66. 
84  Michael M. Rosen, Comment, A Qualified Defense: In Support of the Doctrine of Qualified 
Immunity in Excessive Force Cases, with Some Suggestions for Its Improvement, 35 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 139, 142 (2005). 
85  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802–03 (1982). 
86  Id. at 808–09. 
87  Id. at 810. 
88  Id. at 811–12. 
89  Id. at 813. 
90  Id. at 808–13. 
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focused its inquiry on qualified immunity, reviewing its flaws and then providing 
an “adjustment” to the standard to fix those perceived problems.91 
First, the Court reiterated that executive officials may qualify for two types 
of immunity—absolute and qualified—but that most executive officials qualify 
only for qualified immunity.92 Second, the Court repeated prior justifications for 
qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields officers from “disabling threats 
of liability” and “undue interference” with the public officer’s duties.93 Presum-
ably, protecting against “undue interference” meant encouraging executive offi-
cials who must “exercise their discretion” to “vigorous[ly] exercise . . . official 
authority” by eliminating barriers that would discourage prompt execution: the 
public ire.94 Additionally, the Court emphasized that qualified immunity protects 
society from collective costs.95 This purpose recognized that “the people” pay 
completely for government services; therefore, “social costs”—litigation ex-
penses, diverted resources and energy for more pressing matters, and deterring 
others from becoming a public official—harm the collective.96 Balancing the 
need for compensating innocent victims and deterring unlawful state conduct 
against the need to shield the collective from disabling legislation and encourage 
vigilant execution of laws forms qualified immunity’s primary purpose. 
Third, the Court recognized an important problem in its prior analysis and 
subsequently changed the qualified immunity analysis in a way that still affects 
the analysis today. Prior to Harlow, the Court analyzed qualified immunity as a 
good faith affirmative defense.97 This “good faith immunity,” however, required 
both an objective and subjective component.98 While the objective component 
imposed a “presumptive knowledge” of “basic, unquestioned constitutional 
rights,” the subjective component focused on whether the defendant official 
“knew or reasonably should have known” that he was violating those rights.99 
Naturally, while the objective component could be assessed by looking to the 
outward legal landscape, the subjective component required detailed analysis of 
the mind of the official.100 
 The crux of the issue for the Court was that its prior standard ran afoul of 
two ideas: (1) that insubstantial claims should not go to trial, but (2) the federal 
rules all but prohibited dismissing qualified immunity claims early on because 
the subjective element required fact-sensitive inquiries, and those fact-sensitive 
inquiries likely cannot be dismissed even at the motion for summary judgment 
 
91  See id. at 813–15. 
92  Id. at 807. 
93  Id. at 806. 
94  Id. at 806–07. 
95  Id. at 814. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. at 815. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)). 
100  Id. 
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stage.101 The end product of this regime resulted in defendants being subjected 
to broad and probing discovery that could potentially disrupt efficient govern-
ance.102 
 To fix this problem, the Court issued the modern (mostly) standard for qual-
ified immunity. Defendant officials qualify for qualified immunity when “their 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”103 Furthermore, the Court em-
phasized that courts could, at the summary judgment stage, determine both cur-
rently available law as well as clearly established law at the time the conduct 
occurred.104 The Court reasoned that this process could be done through solely 
objective factors, so no extensive discovery would be necessary.105 
 Interestingly, not one of the Harlow justices seriously dissented. Three of 
the concurring justices agreed whole-heartedly with the Court’s newly an-
nounced substantive standard.106 Four justices joined a concurring opinion that 
also agreed with the Court’s standard but disagreed with Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
decided the same day.107 Justice Warren E. Burger’s lone dissent only criticized 
the Court for not going far enough, arguing that the Court should have granted 
the aides absolute derivative immunity.108 Thus, as a whole, the Court recognized 
two things: qualified immunity should exist, and the Court’s newly announced 
fix represented a good balance between the two different competing interests 
discussed in the majority opinion. 
3. Post-Harlow Case Law 
Post-Harlow, but pre-2015, the Court made a few adjustments to the quali-
fied immunity standard that are worth discussing briefly. In 1987, the Court ad-
dressed the “clearly established law” aspect of qualified immunity.109 In Ander-
son v. Creighton, an FBI agent sought qualified immunity for a warrantless 
search of a home he believed a bank robber had used to hide.110 When sued, the 
agent asserted qualified immunity, but the Eighth Circuit rejected his summary 
judgment motion on qualified immunity because the right to be secure in one’s 
home from warrantless searches absent some exception was clearly estab-
lished.111 
 
101  Id. at 815–16. 
102  Id. at 817–18. 
103  Id. at 818. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. at 819. 
106  Id. at 820–21 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). 
107  Id. at 821–22 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). 
108  Id. at 822 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
109  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). 
110  Id. at 637. 
111  Id. at 638. 
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The Supreme Court then tweaked the qualified immunity standard in an im-
portant way. It recognized that “clearly established law” should not be analyzed 
generally, but more specifically.112 The Court acknowledged that this approach 
implied a fact-specific inquiry but maintained that this still required legal objec-
tivity.113 In other words, comprehending clearly established law requires under-
standing the objective legal landscape and applying it to the facts of the case as 
the officer confronted them.114 Thus, in Anderson, the ultimate question was 
whether the “contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable of-
ficial would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”115 While defin-
ing law so specifically does not necessarily guarantee protection, “in the light of 
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”116 
Interestingly, whereas the Harlow standard received virtual unanimity, three 
justices sharply dissented from the Anderson addition even though two of them 
had agreed whole-heartedly with the Harlow standard.117 The Anderson dissent 
focused on two important reasons for disagreeing with the majority. First, the 
dissent argued that the majority viewed Harlow as creating an “extraordinary 
circumstances” exception whereby an officer would be immunized when he 
could not have known the legal standard even though clearly established law 
does exist.118 Second, the dissent criticized the majority for creating a “double 
standard of reasonableness” that perhaps created perverse incentives for officers 
to violate the Fourth Amendment because of their “two layers of insulation from 
liability.”119 Implicit in the dissent’s discussion is the notion that qualified im-
munity may be appropriate for “high government officials,” but perhaps it should 
not be applied to law enforcement officers in the way it had been applied in other 
contexts.120 
In 2001, the Court again tweaked the qualified immunity standard when it 
decided Saucier v. Katz, an excessive force case where a military police officer 
shoved a potential protestor into a van at a speech delivered by Vice President 
Al Gore.121 In Saucier, the Court established a procedural mechanism for analyz-
ing qualified immunity by requiring courts to first address whether the defendant 
violated a constitutional right.122 Only if answered in the affirmative would 
courts then address whether the law was clearly established at the time of the 
 
112  Id. at 639. 
113  Id. 
114  See id. 
115  Id. at 640. 
116  Id. 
117  Compare id. at 647 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting), with Harlow v. Fitz-
gerald, 457 U.S. 800, 820–21 (1982) (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring). Jus-
tices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall provided the dissenting votes. 
118  Anderson, 483 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
119  Id. at 659. 
120  See id. at 654–55. 
121  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 198 (2001). 
122  Id. at 201. 
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conduct.123 This Saucier analysis rested upon the idea that deciding legal ques-
tions out of order undermines stare decisis because a court could essentially skip 
addressing constitutionality altogether, which effectively eliminates precedential 
possibility in qualified immunity cases.124 
However, like in Harlow, this two-step procedural change sparked criticism 
from the concurring opinion.125 And like in Harlow, that criticism rested upon 
the Court duplicating the objective reasonableness analysis in both Fourth 
Amendment cases and in qualified immunity.126 Ultimately, the Saucier concur-
ring opinion seems to critique the new addition because it creates confusion and 
does not serve judicial economy by duplicating the analysis.127 
4. The Current Qualified Immunity Landscape 
As the law now stands, “[q]ualified immunity attaches when an official’s 
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”128 In short, qualified immunity 
recognizes that “[a]n officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but 
have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal 
in those circumstances.”129 Courts have discretion in deciding both the order of 
the elements (the linear Saucier approach or out-of-turn) and whether to address 
one of the elements or both.130 For qualified immunity to attach, clearly estab-
lished law must be defined with specificity, especially in the Fourth Amendment 
context.131 The defense is so potent that not only does it “protect[] all but the 
plainly incompetent,”132 it is meant to be not just a defense against liability but 
an immunity from suit in the first place.133 
Overcoming a successful qualified immunity defense requires the plaintiff 
to point to case law where the facts and the holding specifically control the 
 
123  Id. 
124  Id. (“This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for 
our insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first 
inquiry. The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip 
ahead . . . .”). 
125  Id. at 210 (Ginsburg, Stevens, & Breyer, JJ., concurring). 
126  Id. at 212–16. 
127  Id. at 210. 
128  City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 
S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)). 
129  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 
130  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (rejecting the Saucier sequence). 
131  Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 503. 
132  Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
743 (2011)). 
133  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (holding qualified immunity decisions are 
immediately appealable because “[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere 
defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously 
permitted to go to trial”). 
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outcome of the case because of how closely analogous the case law is to the 
present case.134 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has provided unclear guidance 
as to which courts can clearly establish law, how many cases could clearly es-
tablish law, or even how factually similar the prior case law needs to be.135 
II.  QUALIFIED IMMUNITY’S PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS136 
As this historical look at qualified immunity has shown, qualified immunity 
is not a static doctrine and has undergone many substantive and procedural 
changes. To some degree, this long history of consistent and drastic change may 
be a problem itself because “unsettled” law may make it difficult for potential 
litigants to consistently grasp what is required. The virtue to this topsy-turvy his-
tory is that a direct and clear pronouncement from Congress could finally solidify 
this unsettled area and provide the Supreme Court solid guidance. 
However, the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements have shifted how 
qualified immunity operates, and the effects of these changes have created prob-
lems for litigants. Some of these problems stem from Congress’s failure to inter-
vene;137 some of these problems are byproducts of complex, competing historical 
revisions;138 some of these problems stem from the inherent tension between a 
judicially created affirmative defense and a statute with language that does not 
provide for any immunities;139 and some of these problems are procedural.140 
 
134  Timothy T. Coates, Covering the Bases: Litigating Qualified Immunity on Summary Judg-
ment, 60 MUN. LAW. 6, 10 (2019). 
135  See Emmons, 139 S. Ct. at 503 (“Assuming without deciding that a court of appeals deci-
sion may constitute clearly established law for purposes of qualified immunity . . . .” (citing 
City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015))). 
136  One creative, proposed solution to qualified immunity is to create constitutional small-
claims courts that state and local governments operate but provide that qualified immunity 
cannot operate within these small claims courts. Ilya Somin, The Case for Creating “Consti-
tutional Small Claims Courts”, REASON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 23, 2019, 8:17 PM), 
https://reason.com/2019/12/23/the-case-for-creating-constitutional-small-claims-courts 
[https://perma.cc/7U74-QSHG]. Another worthwhile suggestion to fixing qualified immunity 
comes from Colorado. Colorado passed bipartisan legislation that creates a “state analogue” 
for § 1983 by permitting individuals to sue state officers in their individual capacity for viola-
tions of the state constitution and prohibits qualified immunity on these strictly state law 
claims. Jay Schweikert, Colorado Passes Historic, Bipartisan Policing Reforms to Eliminate 
Qualified Immunity, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (June 22, 2020, 11:31 AM), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/colorado-passes-historic-bipartisan-policing-reforms-eliminate-
qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/QK8T-6XWS]. But this proposal has its limits. For ex-
ample, it permits civil liability based on a state constitution, not the federal constitution, and 
the two are not coterminous. This may limit potential causes of action and does not help de-
velop a greater body of federal case law. 
137  Infra Section II.A. 
138  See supra Section I.B (discussing the various standards the Supreme Court has espoused 
over time and how there have been inconsistent standards and opinions). 
139  Infra Section II.A. 
140  Infra Sections II.C & II.D (discussing the sequencing problem as well as allocation of the 
burden of proof). 
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Because qualified immunity deals with compensating civil rights victims for con-
stitutional violations, understanding how the doctrine practically operates can 
help us understand the gravity of its effects. 
Additionally, because of a widespread chorus growing around abolishing 
qualified immunity,141 understanding qualified immunity’s problems is more im-
portant than ever. At the outset, I hope to be a limited apologist for the doctrine 
at an unpopular time. As such, I recognize that qualified immunity—as currently 
practiced—may negatively affect individual civil rights while only marginally 
serving its espoused goals. However, at its core, qualified immunity’s policy jus-
tifications remain important.142 The question I seek to answer, therefore, is how 
might we salvage the unpopular doctrine to limit the vices while retaining its 
virtues? 
To salvage qualified immunity, I propose that Congress must step in to pro-
vide the Supreme Court with proper guidance. In doing so, Congress must clarify 
the qualified immunity standard, specify the breadth of its scope, and stamp its 
seal of approval on it. The remainder of this Note will identify qualified immun-
ity’s most pernicious problems, present proposals as part of a Congressional 
package to fix the doctrine, and then point out some of the more likely criticisms 
these suggested revisions will encounter. 
A. The Legitimacy Problem 
The first problem with qualified immunity is its legitimacy. As one critic of 
qualified immunity observed, “[t]he Constitution . . . provides no basis for qual-
ified immunity, and, on its face, the language of § 1983 ‘admits of no immuni-
ties.’ ”143 Indeed, the doctrine has been criticized as nothing more than a mere 
“invention” of the judiciary to protect government officials from a very broadly 
 
141  Supra note 5 and accompanying text. One new voice to the mix is a member of Congress—
Justin Amash—who announced that he would present legislation which would abolish quali-
fied immunity. Justin Amash (@justinamash), TWITTER (May 31, 2020, 6:30 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/justinamash/status/1267267244029083648 [https://perma.cc/9VQL-F4N7]. In his let-
ter, Rep. Amash justifies abolishing qualified immunity for many of the reasons I will discuss 
as issues in this Note: permitting repeated constitutional violations by skipping part of the 
question, a judicially created doctrine that flies in the face of § 1983, and a disincentive to file 
suit. Id. While Congress—or at least one member of it—stepping in is desirable, the hope is 
that Congress can find a better way of striking the balance between tensions rather than strip-
ping away the immunity entirely. One also wonders if this call for congressional abolishment 
of the judicially created doctrine affected the Supreme Court’s decision to deny certiorari in 
the many cases presented to it in its conferencing. 
142  But see Jay Schweikert, The Most Common Defenses of Qualified Immunity, and Why 
They’re Wrong, CATO INST.: CATO AT LIBERTY (June 19, 2020, 2:17 PM), https://www.cato.o 
rg/blog/most-common-defenses-qualified-immunity-why-theyre-wrong [https://perma.cc/LX 
X4-26WE] (arguing that the Graham standard for assessing an officer’s conduct sufficiently 
insulates officers from liability). However, as discussed supra Section I.B.3, while qualified 
immunity may often operate with police officers in the excessive force context, qualified im-
munity also applies outside that context as well where the Graham factors are not at play. 
143  Rudovsky, supra note 55 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)). 
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written law that would seem to impose strict scrutiny on government officials 
when they violate constitutional rights.144 Justice Thomas himself takes the view 
that qualified immunity, as a judicially created doctrine, strays from the statutory 
text to which it is moored.145 Other scholars have similarly criticized qualified 
immunity by questioning its lawfulness146 and its efficacy,147 while the public 
itself has recently expressed strong disagreement over the doctrine.148 
The rub of the matter is that if the Constitution does not explicitly or implic-
itly provide a basis for this doctrine, and if § 1983 truly does not intend for any 
immunities, a judicially-created doctrine seems to fly in the face of what the rule-
makers have decided. Indeed, while qualified immunity may have been borne 
out of some limited common-law immunity doctrines, qualified immunity’s 
eventual justification has rested in the Supreme Court’s public policy considera-
tions.149 And when the Court justifies its extension of a common-law defense to 
a statute entirely for public policy reasons, the judicial power looks awfully close 
to the legislative power. This naturally vexes some people because the judiciary 
appears to legislate from the bench.150 When the judiciary creates or applies an 
affirmative defense to a statute that never intended for such defenses, the practi-
cal effect is that this act amends the law.151 And because amending law is legis-
lative in nature, the constitutional balance of powers could be upset as one branch 
appears to be undertaking the job of another. 
This balance of powers issue is certainly not unique to qualified immunity 
because common-law doctrines are otherwise well-accepted in the legal commu-
nity. But it is a more striking issue in this context. Most likely, this point of con-
tention stems from the fact that the judicially created doctrine here denies victims 
compensation when the “big bad government” is the actor. Additionally, to some, 
qualified immunity has ended up resembling an “unqualified” immunity because 
of the sheer improbability of succeeding against the government on such 
claims.152 Finally, the doctrine affirmatively “vitiates the very statute that was 
 
144  Leef, supra note 53. 
145  Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Because 
our § 1983 qualified immunity doctrine appears to stray from the statutory text, I would grant 
this petition.”). 
146  Baude, supra note 11, at 88 (stating that qualified immunity may be unlawful because it 
“lacks legal justification”). 
147  Schwartz, supra note 12 (showing qualified immunity in practice fails to do its intended 
job). 
148  Majority of Public Favors Giving Civilians the Power to Sue Police Officers for Miscon-
duct, supra note 15; Ekins, supra note 15. 
149  Rudovsky, supra note 55, at 38. 
150  Jason Pye, How the Supreme Court Legislated from the Bench to Create Qualified Immun-
ity for Government Officials, FREEDOMWORKS (June 2, 2020), https://www.freedom-
works.org/content/how-supreme-court-legislated-bench-create-qualified-immunity-govern-
ment-officials [https://perma.cc/ETH2-34ZV]. 
151  Leef, supra note 53. 
152  Baude, supra note 11, at 48. 
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intended to protect all persons . . . in their rights.”153 These common convergent 
criticisms strike at the core of the doctrine’s legitimacy and therefore need to be 
addressed more than common-law immunities in other areas of the law. These 
criticisms perhaps strike even more intensely now. In potential cases of racially 
motivated excessive force, § 1983, which is a remedial measure for racial injus-
tice, appears to be subverted when police officers receive immunity for the very 
actions § 1983 was enacted to prevent.154 
1. The Legitimacy Fix 
Illegitimacy is a serious problem because people are more or less likely to 
accept laws and even court decisions when the public perceives them as being 
legitimate.155 Legitimacy takes on added importance on divisive issues.156 Qual-
ified immunity’s legitimacy has been largely questioned on grounds that it lacks 
any constitutional or statutory basis and is contrary to § 1983’s original intent.157 
Any proposal to cure qualified immunity’s legitimacy must consider two ques-
tions: which branch is best suited to legitimize qualified immunity, and through 
which legal or procedural mechanisms should that branch legitimize qualified 
immunity? 
a. Which Branch Should Legitimize Qualified Immunity? 
Both the Supreme Court and Congress could act to legitimize qualified im-
munity. It is not hard to find compelling reasons to let the Supreme Court handle 
qualified immunity. After all, the Supreme Court is the branch who created, or 
rather applied, this doctrine to § 1983.158 Indeed, Justice Alito has made the case 
that because the Supreme Court created the doctrine, Congress should not inter-
vene and should let the Supreme Court self-correct, at least with respect to Sauc-
ier v. Katz sequencing.159 This argument carries force with at least one scholar 
who claims that the Supreme Court, not Congress, should amend the doctrine 
 
153  Leef, supra note 53 (citing Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners, White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (No. 17-1078)). 
154  The major purpose for § 1983 was to provide private litigants a remedy against state actors 
for constitutional violations, largely due to the Ku Klux Klan’s aggressions viewed as “do-
mestic terrorism.” Michael D. White et al., Federal Civil Litigation as an Instrument of Police 
Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk 
Activities in New York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 9, 38 (2016). 
155  Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary 
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 
708 (1994) (“The maintenance of such legitimacy is crucial because legitimacy is deemed 
necessary to the voluntary acceptance of Court decisions, voluntary acceptance being the only 
type of public acceptance of the decision on which the Court formally can rely.”). 
156  Id. at 709. 
157  Baude, supra note 11, at 50. 
158  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233–34 (2009). 
159  Id. 
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precisely because it has taken such invested ownership in it.160 Likewise, the Su-
preme Court’s history of constant revisions shows there has been at least some 
implicit acceptance of the Supreme Court’s legitimacy to rule on the issue. Fi-
nally, some may find a controversial doctrine, even while policy based, is best 
settled through the Supreme Court, which could be perceived as the most legiti-
mate institution.161 
However, these thoughts are misplaced in the qualified immunity context. 
Congress is in the best position to legitimize qualified immunity because Con-
gress enacted § 1983, and qualified immunity only operates as a defense to 
§ 1983. In other words, Congress is in the best position as the authors of § 1983 
to determine whether any defense to § 1983 should exist. 
This rationale is only strengthened when looking at the commonly accepted 
rules of statutory construction: plain meaning and congressional intent. Section 
1983 has no explicit reference to any defenses; it “admits of no immunities.”162 
Furthermore, Congress had a well-documented and specific goal in enacting 
§ 1983.163 Congress enacted § 1983 to provide a private cause of action against 
government officials for violating an individual’s constitutional rights.164 Con-
gress enacted this statute to prevent government officials from using their au-
thority to violate individual rights, especially when the rights deprivation was 
motivated by race.165 Congress’s statutory enactment of a qualified immunity de-
fense would create a legislative history and a trail of legislative intent that would 
aid the Court in determining the scope of a government official’s liability.166 In 
light of these indicators, a strong defense that deprives plaintiffs of that cause of 
action seems to cut against what Congress originally intended. At the very least, 
it limits § 1983’s efficacy. 
In addition, Congress is also best suited to address qualified immunity be-
cause they are the branch responsible for making law, and Congress is in the best 
position to make critical policy judgments that affect the laws they pass. Con-
gress’s role as representatives of the people put them in the prime position to 
gauge the values of the people and to craft law and policy that reflects those 
 
160  Scott Michelman, The Branch Best Qualified to Abolish Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1999, 2007–09 (2018). 
161  Compare generally Or Bassok, The Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, 16 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 153 (2013) (describing how the Court has acquired legitimacy through public 
opinion polls), with Joseph Carroll, Slim Majority of Americans Approve of the Supreme 
Court, GALLUP (Sept. 26, 2007), https://news.gallup.com/poll/28798/slim-majority-ameri-
cans-approve-supreme-court.aspx [https://perma.cc/4N37-WX4D] (comparing public ap-
proval and trust/confidence in the three different branches of government and finding that the 
Supreme Court is often perceived with greater approval and with greater trust/confidence com-
pared to the other two branches). 
162  Rudovsky, supra note 55 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)). 
163  Supra Section I.A. 
164  42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
165  Mead, supra note 33, at 518 n.6. 
166  See infra Section II.A.1.b (discussing how enacting a bill creates a statutory interpretation 
aid). 
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values. Importantly, Congress should step in because qualified immunity does 
reflect important policy judgments—beyond simple judicial economy—that the 
courts themselves recognize.167 These policy judgments are even more critical 
now as qualified immunity is criticized as permitting the very actions that § 1983 
was enacted to address.168 In fact, because of the highly politicized race issues 
attending qualified immunity right now, some see the Supreme Court’s failure to 
intervene when it had the chance as an abdication of their role in the qualified 
immunity context and an implicit endorsement of congressional intervention.169 
Therefore, Congress should be the branch to make essential policy judgments 
regarding when immunity should apply, as states have done so in generally waiv-
ing and retaining their sovereign immunity.170 
Finally, another compelling reason for Congress to legitimize the doctrine is 
that they can address all of qualified immunity’s issues at once; they can start on 
a clean slate with a consistent intent and provide greater uniformity. The Su-
preme Court, however, is limited by legal doctrines, such as stare decisis,171 and 
it can address issues only as they are presented to the Court. Unfortunately, some-
times it can be difficult to find the right procedural case to address the proper 
issues, and the Court may not be able to get one case that would sufficiently 
present each issue needing address. What could result is a time-consuming, 
patchwork-style doctrine. Indeed, history has already shown that the Supreme 
Court has created inconsistent standards over time, and there has been a substan-
tial shift in the Court’s function.172 While passing meaningful qualified immunity 
 
167  The Supreme Court recognizes that while judicial economy is a recognized public policy 
consideration, qualified immunity is borne out of other concerns also: “deterrence of able cit-
izens from acceptance of public office” and “the danger that fear of being sued will ‘dampen 
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the un-
flinching discharge of their duties.’ ” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)). These ration-
ales go beyond mere judicial economy and enter the realm of public policy considerations 
Congress should be making. This is because these public policy justifications go beyond court 
administration; they substantively affect access to a statutory cause of action. 
168  Compare Hailey Fuchs, Qualified Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point 
Amid Protests, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3esDevA [https://perma.cc/8JFG-
32Q6] (discussing how qualified immunity is at the center of systemic racism debates), with 
Mead, supra note 33, at 518 n.6. 
169  Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Rejects Cases on Qualified Immunity Used to Shield 
Police Officers, A.B.A. J. (June 16, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/ar-
ticle/supreme-court-rejects-cases-on-qualified-immunity-used-to-shield-police-officers 
[https://perma.cc/7F7G-SPXX] (“The Supreme Court’s deeply disappointing decision today 
to punt on the critical issue of official immunity, in this time of national reckoning over police 
violence, places the ball squarely in Congress’ court.” (quoting David Cole, Legal Dir., 
ACLU)). 
170  Infra note 190. 
171  Aaron L. Nielsen & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1856–63 (2018) (discussing how the Court is unlikely to make 
any changes to qualified immunity because it likely qualifies for treatment under “superpow-
ered” statutory stare decisis principles). 
172  Id. at 1859–60 (describing the Court’s standard as “zigzagging”). 
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legislation through Congress may take time, Congress has at least expressed its 
interest in wading into this policy controversy.173 
b. But Through What Approach Should Congress Formalize the 
Doctrine? 
While Congress may be the best branch to legitimize the qualified immunity 
doctrine, there are different approaches to do so. As one approach, Congress 
could pass some form of resolution, which have varying purposes and legal ef-
fects.174 Simple resolutions, for example, are “[o]ccasionally . . . employed to ex-
press the body’s view on some public question” even though they ordinarily deal 
with internal procedures.175 Qualified immunity is certainly a public question, 
but a simple resolution lacks the force of law,176 so any pronouncement would 
be all bark and no bite. While this type of resolution may act as a tool to generate 
meaningful conversation,177 more than a conversation is needed here. 
Concurrent resolutions are perhaps stronger pronouncements than simple 
resolutions because they express the sentiments of both House and Senate.178 
These resolutions are “generally used to express facts, principles, opinions, or 
the legislative will.”179 These resolutions have been used in the past to influence 
judicial interpretation and inform others of the legislative intent behind a passed 
bill.180 However, because these pronouncements lack the force of law, courts can 
use them as aids but are not obligated to respect the resolution’s findings.181 In 
the qualified immunity context, while a simple resolution may be nothing more 
than a conversation starter, concurrent resolutions go one step further because 
courts can use them to aid in interpreting § 1983’s intent. However, these reso-
lutions will still fail to provide meaningful reform182 because courts are not re-
quired to respect Congress’s findings, and they likely would not under stare 
 
173  See End Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085, 116th Cong. (2020). 
174  See generally Denys P. Myers, Joint Resolutions Are Laws, 28 A.B.A. J. 33 (1942). While 
there are three different types of resolutions, they are all still considered less formal and less 
authoritative than bills. Rankin M. Gibson, Congressional Concurrent Resolutions: An Aid 
Statutory Interpretation?, 37 A.B.A. J. 421, 422–23 (1951). 
175  Myers, supra note 174, at 35. 
176  Id. (“ ‘[S]imple’ resolutions–have no legislative value beyond the precincts of Con-
gress . . . .”). 
177  Id. (describing how legislators use this tool deceptively and describing it as “shadow box-
ing in front of public opinion”). 
178  Gibson, supra note 174, at 424. 
179  Id. 
180  Id. at 479–80. 
181  Id. at 424, 480. 
182  But just because I argue they lack meaningful reform, which I define as the inability to 
create legally binding guidance or precedent, does not mean they otherwise lack value or im-
portance, even in this context. See Robert Longley, What Is a ‘Sense of Congress’ Resolution?, 
THOUGHTCO. (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.thoughtco.com/sense-of-congress-resolutions-
3322308 [https://perma.cc/7L2T-5QM4] (describing simple and concurrent resolutions as 
“ ‘sense of’ resolution[s]” and describing ways they are used). 
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decisis principles183 or other principles that would diminish the concurrent reso-
lution’s efficacy.184 
Joint resolutions differ from the prior two resolutions because joint resolu-
tions carry the force and weight of law.185 This types of legislation is often used 
“as supplementary legislation to enunciate an attitude, delineate a policy, [or] 
touch upon extra-legislative matters.”186 In essence, these joint resolutions seem 
to perform the same functions as the other resolutions—creating dialogue and 
signifying support—but perhaps with more authority since they carry the weight 
of law.187 However, the downside to this approach—or any of the resolution ap-
proaches—is that they are unlikely to create meaningful reform, either because 
they cannot by themselves or because they just have not been used in that way. 
Ultimately, even the strongest resolution tool—the joint resolution—likely is not 
the proper approach because both joint resolutions and actual bills require the 
same procedures to become law. If both approaches require the same procedure, 
and really have the same effect, why not expend political capital to send the 
strongest message through an actual bill? 
 Another approach Congress could take to legitimize qualified immunity is 
to formally create or endorse the doctrine through statute. This approach is better 
than any of the resolutions because it is Congress’s most powerful and formal 
tool and thus arguably sends the strongest message while retaining all the virtues 
of any of the resolution approaches. For example, this approach dispenses with 
any criticism that the doctrine would be unlawful because Congress would es-
sentially be amending § 1983 in enacting a statutory qualified immunity doc-
trine.188 Additionally, for the same reasons, no separation of powers concerns 
 
183  Nielson & Walker, supra note 171, at 1855–63 (discussing how the Court is unlikely to 
make any changes to qualified immunity because it likely qualifies for treatment under “su-
perpowered” statutory stare decisis principles). 
184  At least in the state court context, the time between original passage of the bill and the 
concurrent resolution will determine its weight. Gibson, supra note 174, at 480. Because the 
span between when § 1983 was enacted and today is over 100 years, any concurrent resolution 
would likely not be accorded much weight, especially in light of the Court’s own longstanding 
acceptance of qualified immunity. 
185  Myers, supra note 174, at 36–37. 
186  Id. at 37. 
187  See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 78, 116th Cong. (2019) (expressing support for freedom of con-
science principles under the First Amendment); see also Scott R. Anderson & Margaret Tay-
lor, The Long Road Ahead for the Congressional Resolutions on Iran, LAWFARE (Jan. 9, 2020, 
10:04 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/long-road-ahead-congressional-resolutions-iran 
[https://perma.cc/XR2A-VPA9] (discussing the legal effect of joint and concurrent resolu-
tions). Regardless of their varying legal effects, they all could serve to engage in a dialogue 
with the public and with the Supreme Court. These pressures may foster greater change, and, 
at the very least, if not increase its legitimacy, prevent the public from immediately seeking to 
de-legitimize the doctrine through prohibition. 
188  This type of dialogue between the Court and Congress—where Congress enacts a bill after 
Court rulings—is Congress essentially capitalizing on its role to ensure the Court interprets its 
laws correctly, and this has already occurred in the civil rights context. See Michelman, supra 
note 160, at 2019. 
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would exist because the legislative power would simply be doing its constitu-
tionally prescribed function: making law.189 
Moreover, statutorily legitimizing the doctrine represents the best approach 
because Congress would bind the Supreme Court when analyzing § 1983 claims. 
Rather than rely on the several differing doctrinal interpretations from the circuit 
courts on major issues, Congress could sweepingly enact new, explicit, and clear 
guidance for the Court. Because courts often look to legislative history to deter-
mine the scope of a statute, Congress could use the legislative history to send 
clear messages about its intent, the scope of the new qualified immunity, and 
how vigorously courts should construe the statute. This would help fix one of 
qualified immunity’s most pernicious problems: a lack of uniformity. 
Finally, this approach provides great value because a statute would facilitate 
extensive public debate and an accompanying public record. Because of the pub-
lic interest regarding qualified immunity, an opportunity to have open, public 
debate where legislators’ votes are recorded will be an incredibly valuable tool 
for the public to hold their representatives accountable. Indeed, this would also 
allow Congress to engage meaningfully with their constituency to determine 
which values or public policies they want to infuse into the new law—just as 
states have done when waiving their sovereign immunity.190 While sovereign im-
munity and qualified immunity are different, the reasoning for deliberating when 
to waive—or bestow—an immunity is the same: they are driven by public policy, 
and the legislative branch is best seated to gauge public policy. And these public 
policy distinctions are truly important because they showcase the precise values 
each state—or country—esteems.191 In a world post-George Floyd—with riots, 
 
189  One scholar in favor of judicial oversight on qualified immunity argues that there are less 
separation of powers concerns in the § 1983 context because Congress has the authority to 
simply rewrite the law the way it sees fit. Id. at 2018–19. My proposal takes this seriously by 
arguing that Congress should do just that, not by rewriting § 1983 per se, but explicitly refer-
encing § 1983 in delineating qualified immunity’s reach. 
190  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.031 (providing that Nevada waives its sovereign immunity, 
though with some exceptions). Indeed, one critical factor driving qualified immunity is its 
relation to sovereign immunity. Because the United States operates under a dual sovereign 
system, both the states and America have their own system for asserting immunity for tortious 
acts. Thus, each state—like Nevada—can waive their common-law sovereign immunity. See 
Louis E. Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States 
in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REV. 189, 195 (1981) (“[N]o 
state can be sued in its own courts without its consent, regardless of the nature of the claim.”). 
But, like Nevada, each state had the opportunity to retain sovereign immunity for certain situ-
ations, and each state legislature had the opportunity to deliberate on the policy reasons sur-
rounding each of them. However, qualified immunity is a federal law defense, and § 1983 is a 
jurisdictional hook solely for federal law claims. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Importantly, § 1983 claims 
are against private individuals—though it is conduct from their official government capacity 
that works—so a qualified immunity defense is more like a cousin to sovereign immunity than 
a descendant. Regardless, the principle is similar in that, like the state legislatures, Congress 
should concretely deliberate and decide—based upon prevailing public policy reasons—when 
to bestow an immunity rather than waiving one, like in the sovereign immunity context. 
191  E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.033 (providing immunity for a failure to discover even if a duty 
to inspect exists); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0332 (granting immunity for acts and omissions of 
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protests, and fires blazing, and a national dialogue on this issue developing—it 
may be more important now than ever for public representatives in Congress to 
engage meaningfully and openly regarding when and under what circumstances 
we should grant officers immunity when they violate constitutional rights. 
Finally, as an alternative but hopefully an addition, Congress could work 
with the Supreme Court to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to incor-
porate specific pleading standards when dealing with qualified immunity 
claims.192 There are several virtues to this approach. First, as in other cases, this 
reduces legitimacy concerns as Congress would be legislatively ratifying a de-
fense to its own legislatively created law.193 Second, because the Supreme Court 
and Congress can simultaneously amend the federal rules,194 Congress would not 
only legitimize the doctrine but could engage in meaningful dialogue with the 
Supreme Court regarding the Court’s jurisprudence on Congress’s statute and 
sending the Court a strong message. Third, this would give Congress the oppor-
tunity to address on-the-ground issues with qualified immunity, such as its effi-
cacy, by striking what it sees as the best balance between the doctrine’s compet-
ing policy considerations through a new pleading standard.195 Finally, in addition 
to adopting a new pleading standard for qualified immunity, Congress could pro-
vide more detailed guidance to the courts on how to implement that qualified 
 
volunteer school crossing guards). These immunities have important public policy considera-
tions—like encouraging volunteerism—which, without, would interfere with state goals. Con-
gress has the opportunity now to promote certain values, and it should capitalize on this op-
portunity, or, at the very least, enact legislation that would permit each state the policy decision 
to allow, disallow, or modify its own qualified immunity for state and local officials. Perhaps 
this decentralized approach would better allow government officials to engage meaningfully 
with their community and create a community coalition. 
192  See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (adopting a different pleading standard for particular torts—fraud). 
Later in this paper, I propose that Congress adopt a specific pleading standard for qualified 
immunity. Infra Section II.D.1. While it may not be a common practice to adopt specific plead-
ing standards for specific torts, that Congress has already singled out certain torts for this 
treatment provides some basis for adopting specific pleading standards for other torts in other 
contexts, such as in qualified immunity. 
193  See generally Ronald C. Moe & Steven C. Teel, Congress as Policy-Maker: A Necessary 
Reappraisal, 85 POL. SCI. Q. 443 (1970) (discussing how Congress has become weaker as it is 
perceived less as a policy-originator); Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive 
Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 46, 46–48 (1976) 
(discussing how Congress should be the main policymaker in making value-based judgments). 
While these two articles really primarily discuss how Congress should push back against the 
Executive Branch in order to reclaim its role as policymaker, the same should remain true with 
the relationship between Congress and the Court: Congress should push back when the Court 
makes impermissible policy judgments. 
194  28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74; FED. R. CIV. P. hist. n., VII (2019). See generally Catherine T. 
Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1099 (2002) (discussing the rulemaking process regarding the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
195  See infra Section II.D for an examination of how qualified immunity is undermined 
through its execution and how a different pleading mechanism would strike a better balance. 
21 NEV. L.J. 835 
860 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:2  
immunity standard through the notes section.196 Such an approach may help en-
sure greater uniformity197 between courts, as the lack thereof has been a particu-
larly troubling aspect of qualified immunity jurisprudence.198 
In the end, I propose that Congress officially enshrine the doctrine of quali-
fied immunity through statute because it is likely their strongest vehicle to pub-
licly convey the doctrine. However, ideally, Congress would also adopt a new 
pleading standard through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for qualified im-
munity cases for reasons discussed infra Section II.D.1. 
B. The Uniformity Problem 
The second problem with current qualified immunity jurisprudence is the 
rampant discord and lack of uniformity between circuit courts on several funda-
mental questions, most importantly: What counts as clearly established law?199 
Relatedly, this lack of uniformity has also created intra-circuit problems that 
could create inequitable results for plaintiffs.200 
The Supreme Court itself has had varying policies over time and has posited 
different standards201 that have given insufficient guidance to circuit courts. For 
example, the Court has emphasized that even intra-circuit disagreement does not 
guarantee qualified immunity,202 especially if it is a single case.203 Likewise, 
while the Court has sometimes argued that a “consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority” may suffice as clearly established law in the absence of controlling 
 
196  See, e.g., MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (using a 
specific example to illustrate how the rule would work in practice); see also Struve, supra note 
194, at 1158 (discussing some of the functions the notes can serve). See generally FED. R. CIV. 
P. Advisory Notes (2020) (showing how each “note” provides additional guidance to courts 
on how to interpret or implement the rule itself). Of importance, we know that the Supreme 
Court itself often holds the notes in high regards and some justices have often resorted to using 
the notes to interpret the rules. Struve, supra note 194, at 1161. 
197  But see Struve, supra note 194, at 1152–58 (discussing interpretation problems regarding 
the Advisory Notes and how some see them as nonbinding). 
198  Infra Section II.B. But see generally Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil 
Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1 (2016) (discussing how the rule 
amendment process may not ever lead to consequential change from Congress to the pleading 
standards). While the 2015 amendments may not have resulted in meaningful change to plead-
ing standards, such changes in the future are not impossible. 
199  Schwartz, supra note 12, at 19; Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Re-
cent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 
447–48 (2000) (describing different circuit approaches). 
200  One fundamental question—mandatory Saucier sequencing—I address later, but it is an-
other significant area where courts are not uniform, leaving some judges to focus on one por-
tion of the analysis at the expense of others. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, The 
New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 42–46 (2015). 
201  Nielson & Walker, supra note 171, at 1859–60 (describing the Court’s standard as “zig-
zagging”). 
202  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009). 
203  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011). 
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cases,204 the Court has made recent indications that perhaps not even a case from 
a controlling authority may clearly establish law.205 
No wonder, then, that the circuit courts likewise maintain very different 
standards in meaningful ways. For example, both the Ninth and Eighth Circuits 
take a very broad-based approach in defining clearly established law.206 In both 
circuits, the law can be clearly established through binding authority, any avail-
able decisional law (including from other circuits and state courts), and even 
from cases that are not “on point” but leave just one logical conclusion.207 Such 
a broad standard benefits plaintiffs because a plaintiff can pull accepted argu-
ments from a greater body of law to argue that the defendant had fair notice they 
violated constitutional rights. Similarly, this standard also imposes a greater bur-
den on defendants for the same reason: defendants must be aware of the contin-
uing case law in other jurisdictions. 
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits, however, have a narrower approach to quali-
fied immunity than either the Ninth or Eight Circuits.208 While the Ninth Circuit 
looks to all decisional law, the Sixth Circuit rejects the idea that one case from 
another circuit suffices to establish the law for qualified immunity purposes.209 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit permits looking to circuit splits, but circuit splits 
alone, without some controlling authority within the circuit, will be insuffi-
cient.210 In these circuits, it is more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail past qualified 
immunity because the body of law they can appeal to is more limited than in the 
Ninth Circuit. Similarly, the burden to defendants is lighter because the body of 
case law that can put them on notice is limited. 
This disuniformity between circuits also exists with respect to allocating the 
burdens of proof and persuasion. Currently, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and 
 
204  Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999); see also Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 
779–80 (2014) (“To defeat immunity here, then, respondent must show at a minimum either 
(1) that the officers’ conduct in this case was materially different from the conduct in Brosseau 
or (2) that between February 21, 1999, and July 18, 2004, there emerged either ‘controlling 
authority’ or a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’ ” (quoting Ashcroft, 563 
U.S. at 741–42)). 
205  District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 n.8 (2018) (“We have not yet decided 
what precedents—other than our own—qualify as controlling authority for purposes of quali-
fied immunity.”); City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019); City of San 
Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1776 (2015) (“But even if ‘a controlling circuit prece-
dent could constitute clearly established federal law in these circumstances,’ . . . .” (quoting 
Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13, 17 (2014))). 
206  See Coates, supra note 134, at 9–10. 
207  Id. at  9–10 (quoting Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 2007)); Buckley 
v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125, 1129 (8th Cir. 1998); Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 
1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that without controlling authority, courts can look to state 
courts, other circuits, district courts, and even unpublished district court cases for clearly es-
tablished law). 
208  Coates, supra note 134. 
209  Id. 
210  See id. 
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Eleventh Circuits allocate the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff.211 The First, 
Second, Third, Ninth, and D.C. circuits allocate the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant.212 Two circuits, the Fourth and Eighth, split the burdens between the 
defendant and plaintiff and even allocate them differently.213 And how the cir-
cuits allocate the burden of proof is just as messy and contradictory.214 
But does this matter? Are disagreements between circuits on qualified im-
munity all that important? After all, the nature of the court system permits this 
kind of disagreement on many issues. The answer is unequivocally yes, for two 
reasons. 
First, qualified immunity is a creature of federal law. Though it applies 
equally to federal officers and state officers, it is manifestly unfair to hold some 
officers more accountable than others based on nothing more than their geo-
graphic location. Since § 1983 is a federal statute meant to apply equally to all 
state actors, state actors should accordingly be held to the same rough standards 
across the nation. This is especially true where federal officers must enforce fed-
eral law that crosses borders. Depending on where officers commit an alleged 
constitutional violation, they may be held to different standards of conduct. There 
is nothing fair about fair notice when courts can simply impose different stand-
ards of conduct under the same federal statutory hook. This leads to inequitable 
applications: the immunity will either act as a shield for federal officials (they 
had no fair notice, so they cannot be liable) or as an unfair sword (they had no 
fair notice, but they should be liable anyway). 
Second, the real problem lies with the inequitable results for plaintiffs. In 
some circuits, there is a higher bar to receive compensation for injuries than in 
other circuits.215 And these discrepancies are real and affect the degree to which 
people receive compensation. For example, one study showed that as many as 
9.2 percent and 6.7 percent of cases in two district courts were dismissed on 
qualified immunity grounds compared to only 2.3 percent, 1.2 percent, and 1.0 
 
211  Kenneth Duvall, Burdens of Proof and Qualified Immunity, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 135, 143–44 
(2012). 
212  Id. at 144–45. 
213  Id. at 145 (“[T]he Fourth Circuit plac[es] the burden of establishing that the law was clearly 
established on the defendant and that the defendant did not violate a constitutional right on the 
plaintiff, and the Eighth Circuit do[es] just the opposite.”). 
214  Id. at 146–48. This author contends that there are actually four steps to qualified immunity, 
and that the defendant bears the burden on two—establishing entitlement to qualified immun-
ity or proving exceptional circumstances as an exception to objective reasonableness—and the 
plaintiff bears the burden on the other two. Id. at 157. 
215  This Note discusses at length the proposition that different circuits have different standards 
and mechanisms regarding qualified immunity, which dis-uniformity of necessity creates 
higher or lower bars to compensation, since some plaintiffs may have to look to limited case 
law versus others who have the whole expanse of case law at their disposal, and some courts 
tend to vigorously dismiss litigation at earlier stages than others. See supra notes 130, 134–
35, 199–200, 206–14 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 216, 225–29 and accompa-
nying text. 
21 NEV. L.J. 835 
Spring 2021] GIVING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TEETH 863 
percent in three other district courts.216 To some degree, this gives credence to 
the notion that constitutional rights matter more in some circuits than in others. 
No wonder the Supreme Court takes circuit splits seriously when determining 
whether to grant cert petitions. Additionally, this may be the reason qualified 
immunity questions often appear on the Court’s docket. 
1. The Uniformity Fix 
Once again, both Congress and the Supreme Court have the power to create 
greater uniformity. On one hand, the Supreme Court may seem the ideal body to 
clarify qualified immunity’s standards because it created the defense,217 and it 
could possibly offer clarification more quickly than Congress due to the number 
of cases it could choose to see each term. In practical terms, the Supreme Court 
has nine individuals while Congress has 435. This may result in less lock-jam, 
especially since justices from both sides of the political aisle have signaled their 
opposition to qualified immunity.218 
However, Congress is best suited to make this determination for several rea-
sons. First, though the Supreme Court has had many opportunities to clarify qual-
ified immunity—and has taken several cracks at it—they have consistently failed 
to meaningfully clarify the standard and may have harmed it.219 Second, as pre-
viously discussed, Congress is best suited to address qualified immunity’s policy 
goals.220 Furthermore, qualified immunity is not a common-law immunity from 
common-law crimes but a judicially-created immunity from a statutory enact-
ment that “admits of no immunities.”221 Since the judiciary carved out an im-
munity to a statutory right of action, Congress should “speak” to the judiciary 
and specifically carve out the immunities it sees fit to the statutes that it enacts. 
While Congress may be the best branch to clarify qualified immunity, Con-
gress’s rubber stamp on current jurisprudence will do little to unify law between 
circuits or clarify what is required for both victims and defense practitioners. 
Therefore, to fix qualified immunity’s lack of uniformity, I propose that 
 
216  Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, 114 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1101, 
1125–26 (2020). 
217  Justice Alito expressly stated that the Supreme Court is the best branch to amend at least 
some qualified immunity aspects because it is judge-made law. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 233–34 (2009). 
218  Robert Barnes & Ann E. Marimow, Supreme Court Refuses to Reconsider Immunity that 
Shields Police Accused of Brutality, WASH. POST (June 15, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-refuses-to-reconsider-immunity-that-shiel 
ds-police-accused-of-brutality/2020/06/15/1cfc444c-ae7f-11ea-8f56-63f38c990077_story.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/H6VN-42TG] (discussing how Justices Thomas and Sotomayor are ide-
ologically opposites and how Justice Sotomayor often dissents from her colleagues when qual-
ified immunity has been granted). 
219  See supra notes 153–58 and accompanying text. 
220  Supra Section II.A.1. 
221  Rudovsky, supra note 55 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)). 
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Congress should adopt the qualified immunity doctrine via statute,222 and, at the 
same time, adopt new standards to govern its practice that will clarify some of 
the problems that have created dis-uniformity in the courts of appeals. Specifi-
cally, in legalizing qualified immunity by statute, Congress must clarify (1) 
which court(s) can clearly establish the law, (2) which level of factual similarity 
is required to clearly establish the law, (3) when exceptions to qualified immun-
ity should apply, and (4) when officers should not be indemnified even if they 
have been found liable. Because qualified immunity does have value, refraining 
from abolishing the doctrine when it could be practically reformed to avoid to-
day’s errors is desirable. 
a. Which Courts Can Clearly Establish the Law? 
Congress, in adopting qualified immunity by statute, must clarify which 
courts can clearly establish the law.223 I propose that Congress should affirm that 
the Supreme Court can clearly establish the law. Outside the Supreme Court, I 
propose that only circuit court decisions in which the suit is brought should be 
able to clearly establish the law. This proposal rejects the Ninth Circuit approach 
of looking to any available decision law.224 
One major virtue to this approach is that it creates greater uniformity by lim-
iting the number of courts and judges who will create binding qualified immunity 
precedent. This means there will be less total binding case law, and litigants will 
have less case law from which to pull arguments. Indeed, for these very reasons, 
it is proper to dispense with letting state courts create any precedent on qualified 
immunity.225 And because the only courts who can create binding precedent are 
appeals courts, the law will be more slow-moving.226 Slower-moving, more uni-
form rules are desirable because they ensure plaintiffs and defendants in different 
circuits are treated equally under the same federal law.227 And uniformity also 
 
222  Supra Section II.A.1 (discussing why I believe Congress should adopt qualified immunity 
via statute rather than through other mechanisms and why Congress is better suited than the 
Supreme Court to fix qualified immunity). 
223  Coates, supra note 134, at 8 (discussing how the Court has not yet provided clarity regard-
ing this subject). 
224  Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 2007). 
225  AM. L. INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
COURTS 164–68 (1969) (discussing how federal courts are better positioned because of their 
expertise to hear questions on federal matters and that uniformity is necessary on federal ques-
tions). 
226  Although circuit courts often create circuit splits (which undermine uniformity), they are 
also “generally hesitant to depart from precedent set in other jurisdictions, despite being under 
no obligation to adhere to decisions by sister circuits.” Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1578 (2008). Additionally, uniformity has often been seen by the courts 
themselves as necessary—or at least desirable—when interpreting federal law, and limiting 
the courts who can interpret the federal law serves that purpose. Id. at 1580 n.34. 
227  Eric Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System: The United States’ Ex-
perience, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1081, 1090–91 (1986). 
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helps ensure predictability228 at the outset of litigation, which could improve ar-
gumentation, provide attorneys greater knowledge for screening cases, and in 
turn reduce litigation costs.229 
Another virtue is that this reduces the resource burdens on individual de-
fendants. The resource burden occurs at two stages: training/maintenance and 
litigation. Each officer receives some form of legal training to understand the 
rules within which they must operate. Presumably, these policies are hopefully 
based on proper interpretations of the law, though sometimes they are not. And 
when officers are sued, they must look to the legal rules that exist. Each action 
requires some resource expenditure—whether time, money, or other resource. In 
other words, “there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch.”230 Someone—whether 
the city who trained them or the officer who committed the tort—must pay for 
resource expenditures. 
The larger the realm of liability at each stage, the more likely someone must 
expend greater resources. For example, if we were to take the Ninth Circuit ap-
proach, cities may expend greater resources by having their legal staff evaluate 
non-controlling, extra-jurisdictional case law to ensure compliance with legal 
rules in other jurisdictions, just for the sake of liability. Because, as here, I pro-
pose narrowing the battlefield, both cities and officers can focus their training 
solely on the case law that exists in their jurisdiction. This likely will reduce costs 
as the players become more familiar with the rules, and there certainly will be 
less case law through which they would need to sort—either for litigation or 
training purposes. 
While § 1983 imposes individual liability on the officers,231 and thus would 
put the burden on the officer to expend those resources, the widespread use of 
indemnity agreements has effectively shifted that resource burden to the munic-
ipality.232 Unfortunately, resource disparities exist between government entities 
 
228  Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior 
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38–40 (1994). 
229  See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Certainty vs. Flexibility in the Conflict of Laws, PENN. L.: 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 2019, at 9, 15 n.81 (discussing how more predictable and 
certain rules can reduce litigation costs). 
230  ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON IS A HARSH MISTRESS 160, 227 (1966). 
231  MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, FED. JUD. CTR., SECTION 1983 
LITIGATION, 96 (2d ed. 2008), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Sec19832.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4HX3-WMAZ] (discussing the difference between official and private ca-
pacity suits and their respective monetary obligations). As a practical matter, however, officers 
are almost always indemnified by their employer. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 890 (noting that 
officers between 2006 and 2011 only paid .02 percent of $730 million in civil suit because the 
municipality usually indemnifies them). The rationale still remains the same because § 1983 
ultimately imposes the burden on the individual, and municipalities will not always indemnify 
officers, such as when on-duty officers act outside the scope of their duties. Teressa E. Rav-
enell & Armando Brigandi, The Blurred Blue Line: Municipal Liability, Police Indemnifica-
tion, and Financial Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 62 VILL. L. REV. 839, 845–48 
(2017). 
232  Scwartz, supra note 22, at 900–02. The fact that some indemnity waivers will not cover an 
individual officer’s conduct, see id., and because ultimately § 1983 creates monetary 
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for various reasons, and legal staff must make decisions about how extensively 
to research issues for both training purposes and litigation defense. Enlarging the 
field of battle could exacerbate resource disparities and put some defendants at a 
disadvantage compared to their similarly situated but differently located coun-
terparts. And narrowing the battlefield to the specified controlling authority cre-
ates uniform, specific rules that could improve arguments on both ends because 
the litigants will have less case law to sift through, and this could focus their 
arguments on what is important. 
Another virtue to narrowing the field of battle to controlling circuit court 
precedent is that it best comports with qualified immunity’s underlying rationale: 
fair notice. Qualified immunity is about ensuring that officers do not incur indi-
vidual liability for making quick decisions in “hazy” areas of the law.233 Argua-
bly, the law is still hazy when new legal principles are espoused at the district 
court level because the district court’s ruling has not been properly validated by 
an appeals court. Our federal system has built-in appeals courts precisely to en-
sure that the district court gets it right. While courts of appeals affirm lower court 
decisions the vast majority of the time,234 this number is much higher for quali-
fied immunity cases.235 Either way, if one policy reason for qualified immunity 
is to protect officers’ ability to make decisions when the law is unclear, permit-
ting the district court to wrongfully impose liability at any amount is unaccepta-
bly high. In short, when even learned judges disagree on the constitutional rules, 
it is manifestly unfair to hold a mostly legally untrained officer responsible for 
their erroneous, in-the-field decisions. Limiting clearly established law only to 
circuit courts ensures, as far as possible, that purported constitutional rules have 
been vetted before they impose liability on those officers. 
However, there are good arguments to confine the field of battle even more 
narrowly, letting only the Supreme Court clearly establish the law. Such a pro-
posal prioritizes fair notice because the legal rules would only come from one 
body, and those cases would be more easily identifiable and uniform compared 
to the various rules developed at the circuit court level. Additionally, while courts 
of appeals rarely overturn lower court decisions, the Supreme Court very often 
overturns the decisions of cases it actually hears.236 These issues may be more 
 
obligations on the individual officer, an individual officer may still need to expend substantial 
resources in his defense, which justifies a rule of limiting resource expenditure on the defend-
ant—one of the major purposes animating qualified immunity in the first place. 
233  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“Qualified immunity operates in this case, then, 
just as it does in others, to protect officers from the sometimes ‘hazy border between excessive 
and acceptable force.’ ” (quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926–27 (11th Cir. 
2000))). 
234  Barry C. Edwards, Why Appeals Courts Rarely Reverse Lower Courts: An Experimental 
Study to Explore Affirmation Bias, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1035, 1037 (2019). 
235  Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1189–90 (1990). 
236  Edwards, supra note 234, at 1039. But the fact that the Supreme Court does not hear many 
of the various appeals means that, in practical terms, the Supreme Court only ever reverses 
less than 1 percent of all appealed cases. Id. 
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pressing in the qualified immunity context due to the substantial attention the 
Court has given it, which is perhaps why the Court has been very persistent in 
overturning qualified immunity decisions.237 Perhaps for this reason, the Su-
preme Court has questioned—but never decided—whether a single decision 
from a court of appeals can constitute clearly established law.238 
One major problem with permitting the Supreme Court alone to clearly es-
tablish law is that it could result in constitutional stagnation due to the Supreme 
Court’s exceptionally low number of appeals cases it hears each year.239 And 
such stagnation could grant defendants a superpowered defense in qualified im-
munity because defendants could essentially have several bites at the apple be-
fore the Supreme Court’s caseload permits it to hear the case. Were Congress to 
require that clearly established law come only from the Supreme Court, this may 
incentivize the Court to prioritize developing constitutional law by hearing far 
more qualified immunity cases each term. 
In the end, compelling reasons support rejecting the Ninth Circuit approach 
because it creates greater resource burdens on small cities and their officers. Es-
sentially, the Ninth Circuit requires officers and attorneys to constantly monitor 
extra-jurisdictional case law, which imposes greater costs than if they only 
looked at controlling authority. It also flips the concept of fair notice on its head 
because it permits liability based off non-binding case law far removed from the 
officer or attorney and on unvetted district court legal conclusions. In effect, the 
Ninth Circuit approach “bind[s] this circuit by the decisions of others.”240 But 
even in small municipalities, municipal attorneys have some ethical requirements 
to pay attention to controlling case law and to disclose any controlling, adverse 
law.241 
 
237  White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (“In the last five years, this Court has issued a 
number of opinions reversing federal courts in qualified immunity cases.” (citing City of San 
Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015))). 
238  City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2019) (“Assuming without deciding 
that a court of appeals decision may constitute clearly established law for purposes of qualified 
immunity . . . .” (citing Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776))). 
239  Compare Oliver Roeder, The Supreme Court’s Caseload Is on Track to Be the Lightest in 
70 Years, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 17, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/fea-
tures/the-supreme-courts-caseload-is-on-track-to-be-the-lightest-in-70-years 
[https://perma.cc/65P7-W99E], with Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 
[https://perma.cc/9ULG-E3Q3]. 
240  Coates, supra note 134 (quoting Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
241  Arguably, the model rules impose a competency standard on municipal attorneys that re-
quires them to be just smart enough and search just enough case law to be considered compe-
tent. See MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall pro-
vide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
Municipal attorneys who do not pay attention to controlling case law when instructing their 
police officers on the Fourth Amendment might therefore violate this rule, since failing to 
adhere to controlling case law is clearly incompetent. 
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By requiring clearly established law to come only from the aforementioned 
resources, courts would simply be requiring officers and their legal teams to pay 
attention to the decisional law that would be controlling for their jurisdiction. 
This approach best comports with fair notice as it would not be unfair to hold an 
officer liable for violating constitutional rights of which he should have known 
because the right in question had already been addressed by a controlling court 
in his jurisdiction. Additionally, this incentivizes up-to-date legal training in the 
jurisdiction that matters to the officers because cities could then be held liable 
for their failure to properly train officers. The virtue of this approach is that it 
incentivizes prevention rather than purely compensation. 
Finally, this in no way impairs growing a continuing body of case law or 
upsets legal norms. Persuasive authority from other jurisdictions may still be 
used in § 1983 cases, as it should be. However, the rule I propose limits that 
authority to only one portion of the qualified immunity analysis: whether a con-
stitutional violation occurred. Courts should not be constrained to their own ju-
risdiction when developing constitutional law. Indeed, it is often valuable for 
litigants and courts to look to persuasive authority when litigating first impres-
sion cases, for example.242 This proposal would not inhibit whatsoever a court’s 
ability to develop constitutional law based, in part, on extra-jurisdictional author-
ity. 
But courts should be confined to their jurisdiction when looking at the 
“clearly established law” prong. While finding a constitutional violation based 
on extra-jurisdictional authority promotes constitutional development—and thus 
prevention—finding a clearly established law violation instead seeks to shield 
individual officers from liability based precisely on the lack of underdeveloped 
constitutional law. In short, permitting the law to be “clearly established” based 
on any relevant authority would simply duplicate the constitutional violation 
analysis. This proposal refocuses the qualified immunity analysis in a way that 
promotes constitutional law development yet protects officers when they must 
make constitutionally violative decisions, the unconstitutionality of which they 
could not have known beforehand. 
 
 One wrinkle in the analysis is resource level. Larger cities may have more resources that per-
mit them to “farm” out liability or high-profile cases while smaller cities may be forced to 
litigate these issues themselves. It is possible that while larger cities may farm out cases, both 
the smaller and the larger cities may decide to train officers in-house, if any is done at all, 
through their own legal staff. Regardless, all attorneys must comply with the model rules, and 
they apply equally to an attorney’s training of officers as well as their defending of them. 
 Attorneys also have an obligation to disclose controlling, adverse case law to the judge. 
MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(2) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2020). 
242  Michael F. Smith, Litigating Cases with Questions of First Impression, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 
101, 103 (2014) (“[C]ase law from other jurisdictions will provide insight into the public pol-
icy considerations that have guided other courts in reaching the position you are advocating 
on behalf of your client.”). 
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b. What Level of Factual Detail Should Be Required? 
In addition to my proposal that Congress adopt qualified immunity via stat-
ute, Congress should also clarify what level of factual detail is required to clearly 
establish the law. The Court’s current standard requires that “all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” should receive immun-
ity.243 Consequently, when courts determine clearly established law, appeals to 
general rules and standards usually will not suffice.244 Rather, the “rule’s con-
tours must be so well defined that it is ‘clear to a reasonable officer that his con-
duct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’ ”245 And while there does not 
need to be a case “directly on point,” existing precedent does need to place the 
constitutional question “beyond debate.”246 The Supreme Court therefore re-
quires that existing precedent to be particularized with similar facts to the case 
at hand and not defined at a “high level of generality.”247 
Remarkably, the Supreme Court’s standard here actually comports very well 
with the broader qualified immunity policy concerns, and the standard is likewise 
clear. Courts generally must find some case with similar facts, and the controlling 
principle from that case must be so well-defined that every officer would know 
beforehand that his conduct would violate the law. Unique facts would therefore 
militate in favor of granting officers qualified immunity.248 
Such a standard comports well with qualified immunity’s policy of ensuring 
fair notice. When officers are unaware of the law because of the unique circum-
stances presented to them, they lack “fair notice” that what they are doing could 
potentially violate the law. This standard only prevents—or at least it should pre-
vent—an officer from being liable for his or her misconduct when even judges 
themselves cannot agree on whether the rule prohibits the misconduct or when 
no case before has clearly addressed the exact issue that confronted the officer. 
Thus, any uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the propriety of the officer’s ac-
tions should create some deference in favor of the officer, especially in light of 
the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that qualified immunity should “protect all 
but the plainly incompetent.” Because the Supreme Court’s standard regarding 
factual similarity is clear (especially when considered with deference towards 
 
243  White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 
(2015)); City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. 
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)). 
244  Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018). 
245  District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 
U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). 
246  White, 137 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308). 
247  Id. at 551–52 (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742). 
248  Id. at 552 (“[The panel] recognized that ‘this case presents a unique set of facts and cir-
cumstances’ in light of White’s late arrival on the scene. This alone should have been an im-
portant indication to the majority that White’s conduct did not violate a ‘clearly established’ 
right.” (citations omitted)); Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1776 (“Even a cursory glance at the facts 
of Graham confirms just how different that case is from this one.”). 
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the officer), and because it comports well with the underlying policy justifica-
tions, Congress should rubber-stamp this aspect of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
c. Adopting an “Obvious” Exception 
I additionally propose that Congress, in adopting qualified immunity by stat-
ute, should adopt an “obviousness” exception. One major justification for quali-
fied immunity is to prevent officers from hesitating when deciding to enforce the 
law.249 The reasoning is that perhaps by giving officers “breathing room” to make 
quick decisions in hazy areas of law,250 officers will be encouraged to vigorously 
execute the law.251 
As a result, when courts review qualified immunity, they look to whether a 
constitutional right had been violated, and, even if a right had been violated, 
whether that right was clearly established at the time it was violated.252 Because 
the first prong looks only to whether a violation occurred, it is the clearly estab-
lished law prong that acts as a defense and gives officers breathing room. One 
significant strategy for defendants to claim the law is not clearly established, thus 
invoking qualified immunity’s protections, is to marshal unique facts—a strategy 
the Supreme Court has endorsed.253 In essence, the more a defendant can focus 
on the unique facts and nature of the case and distinguish it from past precedent, 
the more likely a court will find the law has not been clearly established.254 This 
defense strategy has taken on increasing importance as the Supreme Court has 
constantly doubled-down on the notion that, when analyzing clearly established 
law, the right in question should not be defined at such a high level of general-
ity.255 And the Court has blasted the Ninth Circuit in the past for defining the 
right so specifically and, in essence, failing to grant immunity based on the 
unique facts presented.256 
However, critics have complained that the Court’s clearly established juris-
prudence makes it too easy for defendants to avoid liability based on nothing 
 
249  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity balances two 
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when 
they perform their duties reasonably.”). 
250  Sampson v. County of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 2020) (Zouhary, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743). 
251  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
252  White, 137 S. Ct. at 551 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)). 
253  See supra note 248. 
254  See White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (“[The panel] recognized that ‘this case presents a unique set 
of facts and circumstances’ in light of White’s late arrival on the scene. This alone should have 
been an important indication to the majority that White’s conduct did not violate a ‘clearly 
established’ right.” (citations omitted)). 
255  Id. at 551–52. 
256  Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (“This Court has ‘repeatedly told courts—
and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of 
generality.’ ” (quoting City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76 (2015))). 
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more than these unique facts.257 Such an argument is troubling if qualified im-
munity’s rationale is fair notice. When the defendant commits a constitutional 
violation, and there is an obviousness to the misconduct, it does not make sense 
to immunize the officer even where the facts at hand are unique and no case 
before is sufficiently like it. Thus, officers should not be immunized for their 
misconduct when they knew, or had reason to know, their conduct would be 
wrongful. 
Adopting such an obviousness exception may help preserve some of the doc-
trine’s legitimacy because it would not immunize officers in highly inflammatory 
and perhaps high-profile situations. For example, the Supreme Court recently 
denied certiorari in the Jessop case.258 This meant that the Ninth Circuit’s grant 
of qualified immunity to the officers in that case would stand. In Jessop, the 
Ninth Circuit granted qualified immunity to officers who essentially stole over 
$200,000 while executing a search warrant.259 At least in a rough sense, the of-
ficers should have known this behavior was wrongful before committing the con-
duct.260 In this case, the obviousness rules may have helped to fairly impose lia-
bility on facts which the Court otherwise would not have, as evidenced by the 
Court’s cert denial. The Supreme Court has already tacitly endorsed such an ob-
viousness rule, though its exact parameters are uncertain.261 And the Tenth Cir-
cuit has also implemented a qualified immunity test that explicitly explores how 
obvious the misconduct was when determining whether qualified immunity 
should apply.262 
 
257  Meera Jagannathan, ‘They Get a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card’: How Qualified Immunity 
Protects Police and Other Government Officials from Civil Lawsuits, MARKETWATCH (June 
29, 2020, 10:26 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/they-get-a-get-out-of-jail-free-
card-why-law-enforcement-and-other-government-officials-are-protected-from-civil-law-
suits-2020-06-24 [https://perma.cc/4GLC-96JH]. 
258  Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied 206 L. Ed. 2d 956 
(2020). 
259  Id. at 939–40. 
260  But see Matt Ford, To Protect and Serve, or Pilfer and Steal?, NEW REPUBLIC: THE 
SOAPBOX (Apr. 17, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157342/supreme-court-police-
qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/CK7Y-2S2W] (referring to the Jessop decision as “stun-
ning” but acknowledging the Court of Appeals’ important distinction: that the officer should 
have known morally theft was prohibited but not necessarily violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment). While the Ninth Circuit court’s decision relies on a fine distinction, it does illustrate 
one problem: Obvious to who? There may be circumstances where misconduct is obvious to 
a judge but perhaps not obvious to an officer. For example, there may be unique situations that 
an officer confronts that typically do not fall within the ambit of his training. However, these 
situations may be well understood by judges in other contexts. 
261  White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (“For that reason, we have held that Garner 
and Graham do not by themselves create clearly established law outside ‘an obvious 
case.’ . . . This is not a case where it is obvious that there was a violation of clearly established 
law . . . .” (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004))). 
262  Then-Judge Gorsuch described the Tenth Circuit’s sliding scale approach as follows: 
“[T]he more obviously egregious the conduct in light of prevailing constitutional principles, 
the less specificity is required from prior case law to clearly establish the violation.” Wilson 
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In short, an obviousness exception may help re-center the focus of qualified 
immunity on fair notice. But the fair notice policy is undermined when officers 
receive immunity for obvious wrongs simply because no other case was factually 
similar. This is because officers receive immunity when no immunity was in-
tended—either under § 1983’s provisions or even under the Supreme Court’s fair 
notice rationale. Adopting an obviousness exception may additionally reduce 
some public controversy if it successfully reduces the immunization of officers 
in highly inflammatory contexts. It additionally promotes § 1983’s goal of com-
pensating victims when a government actor violates their constitutional rights. 
At the same time, this deflection may help appease those who wish to abolish 
qualified immunity outright and engage in meaningful reform discussions. In 
short, adopting an obviousness exception helps strike a better balance between 
§ 1983’s compensation goals and qualified immunity’s public policy goal of en-
couraging vigorous execution of the law. 
d. Addressing Indemnity Waivers 
One additional proposal that may strike the preferred balance between 
§ 1983 liability and qualified immunity is for cities to voluntarily include in 
their indemnity waivers a provision exempting the governing entity from in-
demnifying officers who violate the “obviousness” standard. The officer then 
would be required to satisfy the entire judgment personally, and it would re-
quire the officer to repay any expenses the governing entity incurred defend-
ing the officer. Such a proposal does two things: (1) it comports with the plain 
meaning of § 1983’s text and its purpose—requiring individuals to be respon-
sible for civil judgments in their individual capacity—which indemnity waiv-
ers undermine,263 and (2) it puts the burden clearly on the individual officer, 
which may prevent such egregious violations in the future or deter some from 
joining the force in the first place. 
Furthermore, officers should not receive the benefit of indemnity waiv-
ers—and maybe even qualified immunity—when their actions violate depart-
ment policy.264 The city should not be required to pay for civil judgments 
 
v. City of Lafayette, 510 F. App’x 775, 777 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Casey v. City of Fed. 
Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
263  See Schwartz, supra note 22. However, at least one scholar sees indemnity waivers as “less 
prevalent” and consequently less important for ensuring police accountability than other 
measures. See Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1221 (2017) (rec-
ognizing that a “significant number of contract require the municipality to indemnify officers” 
but also noting that “[p]olice-reform advocates may argue that any of these provisions consti-
tutes a significant limitation on officer accountability . . . [but they] seemed less prevalent than 
[other] categories”). 
264  Notably, the Ninth Circuit looks to police department training in determining whether of-
ficers have violated clearly established law, Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052, 
1061–62 (2003), even though the Supreme Court has said that such materials should not affect 
the analysis. City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) (“Nor does it 
matter for purposes of qualified immunity that . . . the officers did not follow their 
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against an officer when the officer violates the city department’s policy in the 
first place, especially when the city has done its due diligence in training the 
officer. Of course, if the city has not appropriately trained the officers, other 
causes of action exist that may provide compensation.265 Permitting indem-
nification for officers when they violate departmental policies only hurts tax-
payers because, ultimately, taxpayers must bear an indemnified officer’s 
costs. Such a policy does not make sense when the municipality has fully 
complied with its obligation to properly supervise and train officers. Because 
department policies are closer to the officer’s mind and action, it would not 
be unfair to hold them liable when they violate those policies. 
C. The Sequencing Problem 
The third problem with qualified immunity is that, in its current state, it does 
prevent creating a continuous body of constitutional law. As previously dis-
cussed, the Supreme Court established the Saucier analysis.266 The Saucier anal-
ysis created a rigid two-part mandatory sequencing.267 First, in assessing quali-
fied immunity, a court must establish whether a constitutional violation 
occurred.268 If no violation occurred, the inquiry ends as qualified immunity itself 
is not needed.269 Only after a violation has occurred would a court then identify 
whether the constitutional right allegedly violated was clearly established at the 
time it was violated.270 The Court then announced its reasoning and policy justi-
fication for a required sequencing: “The law might be deprived of this explana-
tion were a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly 
established . . . .”271 
However, the Court has since reversed course (again)272 and no longer re-
quires the strict Saucier sequencing.273 Though permitting courts to use that se-
quencing if they so choose, the Supreme Court primarily did away with the se-
quencing on judicial conservation of resources grounds.274 The effect of 
eliminating Saucier sequencing is problematic for many reasons. First, it puts the 
 
training. . . . Even if an officer acts contrary to her training, however . . . that does not itself 
negate qualified immunity . . . .”). 
265  See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). 
266  Saucier v Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 
267  Id. at 201. 
268  Id. 
269  E.g., id. 
270  Id. 
271  Id. 
272  Karen M. Blum, The Qualified Immunity Defense: What’s “Clearly Established” and 
What’s Not, 24 TOURO L. REV. 501, 507 (2008) (eerily predicting that though mandatory se-
quencing was then required, it would “likely change  in the not-too-distant future”). 
273  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
274  Id. 
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courts in “permanent limbo.”275 In other words, because courts can refrain from 
deciding difficult constitutional questions when there is another way (in this case, 
deciding if the law was “clearly established”), courts can continually avoid con-
stitutional issues, effectively preventing the law from fully developing on any 
issue.276 And available studies show that the Court’s departure from the rigid 
two-step Saucier approach has led to some constitutional stagnation, even if lim-
ited.277 For example, the appellate courts were much more likely to find a consti-
tutional violation under Saucier’s mandatory two-step sequencing than under the 
non-mandatory sequencing courts use now to analyze qualified immunity.278 
Thus, constitutional stagnation is not some sort of theoretical boogeyman—
it is very real with very real consequences. A more recent study substantiated 
these claims, showing that since Pearson v. Callahan, courts have increasingly 
bypassed the constitutional violation analysis and skipped to the clearly estab-
lished law prong.279 In effect, this means officers may continue to allegedly vio-
late constitutional rights and receive immunity for it because not one of the prior 
courts who first heard the matter took the time to decide if the officer violated 
constitutional rights.280 Furthermore, a comparison between Saucier qualified 
immunity cases and Pearson qualified immunity cases shows that in the Pearson 
non-mandatory sequencing era, officers receive immunity far more than they did 
under Saucier.281 It is possible that this significant change stems from the courts’ 
failures to “clearly establish” Fourth Amendment law by not deciding the con-
stitutional violation prong. Had a court clearly established the law, one victim—
rather than two, three, or maybe even four—would have been the only one denied 
compensation for an officer’s bad behavior. 
In addition to leaving constitutional law less developed, “[d]eterrence is di-
minished . . . and the individual and societal interest in the vindication of rights 
is sacrificed.”282 When qualified immunity prevents a constitutional body of law 
 
275  Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Joshua Matz, Avoiding Permanent Limbo: Qualified Immunity 
and the Elaboration of Constitutional Rights from Saucier to Camreta (and Beyond), 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 643, 643 (2011). 
276  See id. at 651. 
277  Nielson & Walker, supra note 200. The authors’ findings are mixed: Post-Pearson, courts 
do not avoid taking up new constitutional issues, but the rate at which they find constitutional 
violations post-Pearson has decreased, leading to some stagnation. Id. at 37–38. 
278  Id. 
279  Andrew Chung et al., For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS: 
INVESTIGATES (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-re-
port/usa-police-immunity-scotus [https://perma.cc/RN66-VJ7L] (finding that at least three 
dozen cases have been handed down without going through the full two-step process). Pearson 
is the seminal case in which Justice Alito announced that the Court would no longer require 
the Saucier two-step sequencing. 
280  Id. (“In effect, the same conduct can repeatedly go unpunished.”). 
281  Id. (showing that the percentage of plaintiffs winning dropped from 57 percent to 43 per-
cent). 
282  Rudovsky, supra note 55, at 55. It is interesting that Rudovsky considered this implication 
well before mandatory sequencing was required. However, as mandatory sequencing has been 
21 NEV. L.J. 835 
Spring 2021] GIVING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TEETH 875 
from being fully developed, law enforcement officers will continue to act in po-
tentially unlawful ways because courts “dodge” the difficult constitutional is-
sues. That leaves a salient question: Can a ruling that a right was not clearly 
established serve to “clearly establish” law in the future? Perhaps not, as this 
does not give an officer “fair notice” that any constitutional right could be vio-
lated since the Court never ruled on whether a constitutional violation occurred 
at all.283 Only when the court at issue rules on the constitutional question should 
an officer have “fair notice,” though some courts have cleverly disguised the is-
sue.284 
In short, the Court’s usual policy of constitutional avoidance is not well-
suited for qualified immunity cases.285 Additionally, the Court’s espoused justi-
fication of judicial conservation of resources286 fails because qualified immunity 
requires that courts evaluate the contours of a constitutional right to determine if 
clearly established law exists.287 In other words, the Court saves no resources in 
skipping to the second part of the question when the second part of the question 
requires the court to at least evaluate the most important and time-consuming 
aspect of the first part of the question. 
Finally, one other problem with Pearson’s elimination of the Saucier ap-
proach merits some attention. Giving courts discretion on whether to declare a 
constitutional violation or not gives different circuits more or less of a voice 
when it comes to establishing a constitutional right.288 For example, the Ninth 
Circuit, when deciding to exercise discretion, creates rights—or rather finds vi-
olations of previously unknown rights—at twice the national rate of the other 
circuits.289 The implication of this is that—at least between circuits—individuals 
 
“undone,” it is fitting that the concerns of a pre-Saucier time should come back to haunt the 
Court. 
283  See Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 590 (9th Cir. 2018) (“In the face of the then-current 
law, there was not a clearly established constitutional violation. Going forward, however, the 
law is clearly established in this scenario.”). 
284  See id. at 588, 590. Additionally, even when courts may not “dodge” the constitutional 
violation question entirely, there may be some danger they will nonetheless “finesse” or 
shortchange the analysis because the clearly established law prong provides such a strong de-
fense. See Rudovsky, supra note 55, at 56. 
285  Kirkpatrick & Matz, supra note 275, at 651; see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 
705–07 (2011) (discussing the problems with the Court’s constitutional avoidance policy on 
qualified immunity claims). 
286  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236–37 (2009). 
287  Kirkpatrick & Matz, supra note 275, at 651; see also Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified 
Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 485 (2011) (“Often the question of what law is 
‘clearly established’ is determined by deciding the scope of the right the plaintiff asserts.”). 
288  Nielson & Walker, supra note 200, at 40–41. 
289  Id. at 41. However, the Supreme Court has consistently chided the Ninth Circuit for finding 
constitutional violations by taking too general of an approach to the factual inquiry required. 
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (“This Court has ‘repeatedly told courts—and 
the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of gener-
ality.’ ” (quoting City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1775–76 (2015))). This 
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living within the Ninth Circuit are much more likely to receive compensation 
than the other circuits, which leads to the problem we previously addressed: lack 
of uniformity.290 It also means that the officers within the Ninth Circuit have a 
faster moving body of law to govern them. 
1. The Sequencing Fix 
As part of a congressional reform package, I would recommend reintroduc-
ing the Saucier analysis. Requiring the courts to first look to see whether a con-
stitutional violation occurred is beneficial for two reasons: (1) it actually helps 
preserve the judicial conservation of resources argument in some cases because 
if no violation occurred, then the court does not need to go any further; and (2) 
it best provides officers “fair notice” because the existing constitutional law will 
be more clear, and they will consequently have more guidance in enforcing the 
law. While the right at stake will be clearly established, the only remaining dif-
ficult question for the court is “caging in” the specific facts of the case to see 
whether those facts fall within a previously declared right. 
Additionally, the congressional reform package will create greater uni-
formity between circuits as well as within them. Because the current law permits 
intra-circuit judges discretion to apply the sequencing or not, some intra-circuit 
judges will, and others will not.291 For example, Republican judges are much 
more likely to decide the law was not clearly established rather than seek to find 
a constitutional violation in the first place.292 This problem is more clear in the 
Ninth Circuit because the Ninth Circuit has more judges and thus more combi-
nations of panels to draw from, which—depending on the “luck of the draw”—
could determine whether a right is violated in the first place or whether it just 
was not clearly established.293 This often holds true when Ninth Circuit cases are 
heard en banc because the Ninth Circuit will not have all twenty-plus judges hear 
the case. This unfairly applies the law to similarly situated victims and deprives 
plaintiffs and defendants the full gambit of procedural protections given to oth-
ers. Currently, the courts have little guidance intra-circuit on when to “avoid” the 
constitutional problem,294 so clear guidance from Congress will make that deter-
mination simple. 
 
shows the Supreme Court often locks horns with the Ninth Circuit on their qualified immunity 
jurisprudence. 
290  Nielson & Walker, supra note 200, at 42. 
291  Id. at 42–46. 
292  Id. at 45–46. 
293  Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the “Mini-Supreme Court”, 13 
J.L. & POL. 377, 388–89 (1997) (discussing how the Ninth Circuit’s large size forced them to 
hold “mini” en banc proceedings). 
294  See Kirkpatrick and Matz, supra note 275, at 655–56. Justice Kagan eloquently describes 
the uncomfortable tension in qualified immunity cases with the Court’s policy on avoiding 
far-reaching constitutional questions in Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 705–07 (2011). 
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D. The Execution Problem 
The fourth problem, and perhaps most controversial, is that qualified im-
munity in practice undermines qualified immunity’s purpose. As an affirmative 
defense, qualified immunity can be raised at any stage of the litigation, even the 
motion to dismiss stage.295 And the Supreme Court has repeatedly (and perhaps 
more consistently than any other facet of qualified immunity) emphasized that 
qualified immunity should be asserted as early as possible.296 The whole point of 
qualified immunity is to provide officers with “immunity from suit rather than a 
mere defense to liability”297 and to ensure “insubstantial claims” are weeded out 
before official discovery even begins.298 
Because motions to dismiss and summary judgment motions require fact-
specific inquiries, courts find it difficult to actually grant qualified immunity at 
the pleading stage.299 One reason for this is the procedural posture: motions to 
dismiss require liberal constructions, and motions for summary judgment require 
a slant in favor of the nonmovant party.300 This no doubt partially accounts for 
Joanna Schwartz’s findings that in a two-year period, when defendants raised 
qualified immunity, only 0.6 percent of those cases were dismissed at the motion 
to dismiss stage, and only 2.6 percent were dismissed at the summary judgment 
stage.301 This study suggests that qualified immunity fails to accomplish one of 
its major goals: dispensing with litigation early and providing immunity even 
from suit, not just liability.302 
For a Court so concerned about protecting government officials from the 
burdens of litigation,303 these numbers are concerning. The numbers get increas-
ingly concerning as there has been a steady rise of litigation under § 1983, put-
ting qualified immunity front and center in an increasing number of cases.304 
Consequently, qualified immunity remains all the more relevant as more and 
more state and local governments must somehow dispose of and answer the nu-
merous § 1983 claims against its officers. Thus, ensuring qualified immunity ac-
tually serves its intended purpose has become far more important. After all, what 
good is a defense that does not serve its intended purpose? The Supreme Court’s 
 
295  Reinert, supra note 287, at 487. 
296  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 
227 (1991)). 
297  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); see also Coates, supra note 134, at 12. 
298  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 n.2 (1987). 
299  See Coates, supra note 134, at 11; see also Blum, supra note 272, at 508 n.34 (citing Hy-
drick v. Hunter 449 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006)) (“[A] motion to dismiss on qualified im-
munity grounds puts the court in the difficult position of deciding far-reaching constitutional 
questions on a non-existent factual record.”); Leon Friedman, Qualified Immunity When Facts 
Are in Dispute, 16 TOURO L. REV. 857, 864 (2000). 
300  Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005). 
301  Schwartz, supra note 12, at 2. 
302  Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526–27. 
303  Schwartz, supra note 12, at 14. 
304  Id. at 27 tbl.1. 
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consistent policy justification for enforcing qualified immunity has been to shield 
government officials from litigation as early as possible, so the officials can vig-
orously execute the law without backseat driving.305 
We have the competing concerns of private individuals whose constitutional 
rights have been potentially violated, however. Granting these victims justice—
and compensation—as early as possible is also desirable. The legal procedural 
framework used as a vehicle for vindicating those rights currently requires not 
automatically dismissing claims without any factual record.306 In other words, 
tensions arise because through § 1983, Congress requires complete vindication 
while the Supreme Court requires early dismissal.307 These competing concerns 
require that one side must give ground in every qualified immunity case. Which 
side wins, then, likely results from the individual judges and their theories of how 
to resolve this sticky dilemma,308 as there is little guidance from the Supreme 
Court. 
1. The Execution Fix 
So far, the “adjustments” I have proposed to qualified immunity have been 
straightforward in their application and require little more than clarifying exist-
ing law. Additionally, these changes do not require much in the way of judicial 
resources nor do they substantively alter how practitioners litigate qualified im-
munity. But ensuring that qualified immunity serves its intended purposes re-
quires more than just mere legal changes. While the legal clarifications make the 
doctrine better, simpler, and more legitimate, they do nothing to resolve the in-
herent paradox between an affirmative defense to litigation and a procedural 
framework that requires permissive readings for fact-intensive scenarios. If the 
only thing standing in the way of satisfying the competing claims is the proce-
dural framework, the smart move is to amend that procedural framework. 
Qualified immunity is important at three stages: the pleading stage, pre-trial 
motion stage, and the trial stage. However, this paper focuses only on a congres-
sional fix to the pleading requirements for qualified immunity. In the following, 
I provide three suggestions regarding how to establish a pleading requirement 
and enforcement mechanism that support the purpose and benefits of qualified 
immunity. 
 
305  See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1866 (2017) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). 
306  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 238–39 (2009) (expressing that deciding qualified 
immunity at the pleading stage can be difficult when the factual record from the pleadings is 
underdeveloped). 
307  Compare Rudovsky, supra note 55 (describing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “admits of no im-
munities” (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976))), with Saucier v. Katz, 533 
U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (recognizing that the qualified immunity decision should be made early 
in the litigation process). 
308  See Nielsen & Walker, supra note 200, at 43–46. 
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First, I propose that Congress require a § 1983 plaintiff plead with particu-
larity the facts which, when taken as true, show the officer violated a constitu-
tional right. This mirrors the typical pleading requirements for alleging fraud.309 
Imposing a heightened pleading standard under a § 1983 allegation makes sense 
because it reinforces some of the concerns against suing a polity of which the 
litigant is a part. For one, a heightened pleading standard may disincentivize friv-
olous allegations and immature pleadings (when complainant prematurely al-
leges a cause of action without much of the factual story)310 and provides officers 
early and fair notice of the precise conduct alleged to be unconstitutional. 
While some may recoil at requiring a heightened pleading standard for fac-
tual allegations on civil claims because it may weed out more potential litigants, 
it is important to remember that this standard will not substantially impair com-
plainants with good facts. Complainants will still enjoy the presumption that all 
well-pleaded facts are taken as true in defeating a motion to dismiss.311 Addition-
ally, even when complainants may struggle to allege a “particular” story because 
they failed to initiate a lawsuit when the memory or action was fresh, they always 
have recourse to informal discovery. 
Normally, informal discovery may be difficult when dealing with two pri-
vate parties because the actions may often be of private concern, or there may 
just be little available informal evidence. However, because § 1983 always in-
volves a state actor, much informal discovery (or, perhaps, pre-discovery) is 
available for potential litigants. Both local and national laws require the public 
have some access to public records, and this can often include body cam footage, 
incident reports, and perhaps officer-specific information.312 
Consequently, litigants seeking to impose liability on state actors have a 
wealth of publicly available pre-discovery documents which can assist them in 
“pleading with particularity” within the statute of limitations without requiring 
officer depositions. This informal discovery permits potential litigants to access 
a wealth of information that will help them clear a heightened pleading hurdle 
without subjecting the officer to the costs of litigation. And all too often, in an 
age of constant videoing of police actions, widely available videos can help a 
 
309  See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
310  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become 
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 98–99 (2007). But see gen-
erally Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011) (dis-
cussing how heightened pleading standards may not actually do what advocates claim). 
311  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
312  See generally Chris Pagliarella, Police Body-Worn Camera Footage: A Question of Ac-
cess, 34 YALE L. POL’Y REV. 533 (2016) (discussing the Freedom of Information Act and how 
different states have taken different approaches in considering body cam footage as a public 
record and the difficult choices municipalities must make in determining whether to disclose 
such a record). Additionally, informal discovery tools—like bystander video recordings—may 
receive additional protections via the First Amendment, see generally Tyler Finn, Note, Qual-
ified Immunity Formalism: “Clearly Established Law” and the Right to Record Police Activ-
ity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 445 (2019), and these protections may encourage or lead to additional 
informal discovery. 
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potential litigant clear that heightened pleading hurdle, especially as govern-
ments enact protections for videoing officer interactions.313 
Second, I propose that Congress require the complainant anticipate the of-
ficer will invoke qualified immunity and plead past it. Thus, in addition to plead-
ing a particular factual story that shows the officer violated a constitutional right, 
I propose the complainant must also, in their complaint, pinpoint the exact case 
law that they allege should have put the officer on fair notice that the officer 
violated the complainant’s constitutional rights. To be clear, the complainant still 
enjoys a presumption that well-pleaded particular facts are true.314 At this stage, 
then, the complainant may use those facts to particularly describe how the spe-
cific case law put the officer on fair notice that his specific conduct constituted a 
constitutional violation. In other words, the plaintiff must show through existing 
case law that the officer should have known better. 
In reviewing this under a motion to dismiss, I propose courts need not be 
rigid: a “close enough” standard may suffice to survive a motion to dismiss. Un-
der this new standard at the motion to dismiss stage, courts would be encouraged 
to focus on the clearly established law prong of the analysis. All a reviewing 
court needs to do would be to ask: Taking the complainants facts as true, would 
the case law proposed likely have let the officer know beforehand that his conduct 
was unconstitutional?315 If so, the case may proceed; if not, it must be dismissed. 
Once again, there would be no change to other procedural mechanisms, so even 
if a plaintiff failed the first time, they could still get another chance to properly 
plead their case. 
One specific virtue that animates this proposed fix is the ability to simplify 
the standard and make it more meaningful. Currently, for qualified immunity to 
attach, the defendant must raise it in their complaint and essentially “prove the 
negative” because they must attempt to show that clearly established law did not 
exist to put them on notice.316 If they cannot show the lack of case law in their 
 
313  See Catherine Kim, Viral Videos of Police Violence Are Leading to Disciplinary Action, 
VOX (June 6, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/6/21282412/protests-viral-videos-
police-violence-disciplinary-action-suspension-firing [https://perma.cc/H6MX-6NKD]; see 
also Frank Rudy Cooper et al., Nevada Criminal Justice Reform Bills Falls Far Short, NEV. 
INDEP. (Aug. 1, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/nevada-criminal-
justice-reform-bill-falls-far-short [https://perma.cc/S4WJ-DAVF] (discussing a Nevada bill 
on criminal justice reform that would offer protections to those who record police brutality). 
314  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). 
315  This “likely” standard at the motion to dismiss stage resembles one of the factors used in 
evaluating whether a preliminary injunction should be issued. See, e.g., Rubin ex rel. N.L.R.B. 
v. Vista Del Sol Health Servs., Inc., 80 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing 
how a preliminary injunction requires a threshold showing of “a likelihood of success on the 
merits”). 
316  As an affirmative defense, the burden rests on the government officials to plead and prove 
qualified immunity, including the proposition that clearly established law did not control their 
actions. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). Of a necessity, this requires the 
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responsive pleading, the motion will be denied and defendants lose the virtue of 
a defense meant to shield them at the earliest stages of litigation.317 Thus, gov-
ernment attorneys must sift through all potentially available case law to make 
their case. The burden of that exhausting research falls on government attorneys 
who must shift that monetary burden on taxpayers. But by placing the burden on 
the plaintiff, we would save the government from expending significant re-
sources and restrict them to only distinguishing the complainant’s proposed case 
law from the complainant’s proposed facts. Additionally, it makes sense to put 
the initial burden on the plaintiff since they have the greatest incentive, those 
cases are contingency-based, and it is difficult to prove the negative.318 This en-
sures state actors are not treated as presumptively guilty at the pleading stages. 
Third, I propose that Congress permit, as an implementation option, allow-
ing courts to choose to utilize screeners to first review § 1983 complaints to see 
if the complaints meet the baseline requirements. This option already exists for 
pro se litigants within prison under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.319 These 
screeners could look to see whether procedural requirements have been met and 
the likelihood that a court will find it meets the necessary requirements. These 
screeners could act as a “buffer” in § 1983 litigation between the litigant and the 
officers when the litigant has failed to present a claim “within the ballpark” of 
stating a valid cause of action. This reinforces judicial economy since these 
screeners can become “experts” in this area and because only a finite amount of 
clearly established law can exist in an area of law. Screeners also reinforce qual-
ified immunity’s main goal—protecting officers from insubstantial litigation—
because the screeners act as an additional buffer or shield between a potential 
litigant and the officer. 
At the outset, these revised pleading requirements impose a higher standard 
on complainants than those imposed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.320 
And understandably, many activists may question whether these pleading 
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requirements also violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its purpose.321 After all, on its 
face, § 1983 “admits of no immunities.”322 It is a fair criticism. Undoubtedly, 
many more potential litigants may be screened out at the initial pleading stage 
than would otherwise be under current practice.323 However, a few principles 
militate against the conclusion that discouraging potential litigants necessarily 
impedes civil rights litigation. 
For one, a goal of the pleading standard mechanism is to balance the need 
for judicial economy (screen out improper litigants) and the desire to encourage 
victims to pursue legal remedies.324 While our earlier legal history loosely en-
forced a very permissive pleading standard,325 the modern landscape has shifted 
to a more stringent pleading standard.326 Here, this standard, while imposing a 
heightened pleading requirement for specific cases, reflects the value that we 
should permit only potentially successful litigants to substantially expend judi-
cial resources on legal matters. Thus, in discouraging frivolous or likely unsuc-
cessful litigation earlier in the process, the standard preserves judicial economy 
and brings pleading practices in harmony with the Supreme Court’s espoused 
purpose for the doctrine: shielding officers from disabling litigation.327 
Next, some critics may argue this will cast a wider net in that it may discour-
age potentially successful litigants from pursuing a claim because it poses a 
greater degree of difficulty. However, this argument should not carry the day. 
While, as mentioned, this imposes a higher obstacle for all litigants, not just 
likely unsuccessful litigants, the additional burden is minimal. Indeed, this may 
even save some litigants time, since, in stating their claim and pointing to appli-
cable case law, it narrows the field from which to argue. Because qualified im-
munity remains fact-intensive and the Supreme Court requires a high degree of 
specificity,328 litigants will only have a limited number of cases from which to 
argue their case in the complaint. A successful pleading showing qualified im-
munity may apply may very well discourage state actors from relying on quali-
fied immunity in those cases and instead focus their claim on whether a violation 
occurred in the first place. 
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This leads to another desirable outcome and one already addressed earlier as 
a “fix” for qualified immunity.329 In encouraging and forcing litigants to focus 
their inquiries on whether a constitutional violation occurred, constitutional case 
law in the area will continually develop. This achieves the desirable outcome of 
providing a comprehensive body of law that will then serve to put other officers 
in the future on “fair notice” that their actions could violate constitutional rights. 
More than encouraging litigants, a successful pleading mechanism should, where 
possible, prioritize and incentivize prevention rather than mere compensation. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this mechanism really does not alter 
how the law should be operating anyway. As mentioned, the first part of the 
pleading standard does not change existing law or pleading practice. Addition-
ally, while the “likely” standard and requiring plaintiffs to plead past qualified 
immunity are new, plaintiffs are still protected through current motion practice. 
Plaintiffs get to tell the story with their facts, and those facts cannot be disputed; 
motions to dismiss are therefore generally inappropriate on factually disputed 
constitutional violation questions.330 This fix just re-emphasizes that courts must 
still look at the clearly established law prong on a motion to dismiss, and this 
analysis should not be shortchanged based on any factual disputes, since the facts 
must be plaintiffs’ facts.331 True, requiring a complainant to anticipate and plead 
the non-existence of an affirmative defense is new, but, as discussed, this new-
ness solely serves to promote the Supreme Court’s goals without adding much 
of an additional burden. 
Finally, Congress may choose to implement this via amending the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and creating special institutionalized pleading require-
ments for qualified immunity cases. Or Congress may so choose to implement 
via a separate statute. Regardless, the outcome would remain the same. 
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, qualified immunity poses an interesting dilemma where a past 
Congress has required vindication, but the Supreme Court, in interpreting the 
defense, requires early dismissals. However, this inherent controversy need not 
be so stark. The qualified immunity doctrine remains in disarray because Con-
gress refuses to provide clarification on the scope of a statute it has passed. Con-
gress can strike the right balance between those competing interests through 
amending its pleading mechanism and standards. In doing so, Congress will give 
qualified immunity renewed legitimacy and best vindicate litigants’ rights, while 
also protecting our public officials from frivolous litigation. 
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